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SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND
BANKRUPTCY: THE LICENSOR'S PERSPECTIVE
J. Dianne Brinson*
Abstract: This Article addresses a special problem within the software-industry-licen-
see bankruptcy and the need to protect the rights of licensors in the software. Although
federal law now protects the rights of a software licensee in the technology when a licensor
undergoes bankruptcy, little guidance exists as to the effects of licensee bankruptcy upon
the software licensor. This Article thoroughly reviews the relevant bankruptcy and copy-
right law as they relate to the computer software area, and then discusses why a licensor
should consider avoiding the possibility of a software license being treated as an executory
contract. The author concludes by offering practical drafting considerations on how to
avoid executory contract treatment as a way of preserving the licensor's rights in the
software.
In the past decade, America's software industry has grown at a tre-
mendous pace.1 As ownership of personal computers has become
widespread, the market for microcomputer software has mushroomed,
while development of new software for medium-scale and high-end
computers continues.2 In addition, "smart" appliances-coffee mak-
ers, microwaves, telephones-contain microprocessors, tiny com-
puters that require their own software.3 Alongside the software
industry's growth, various business relationships and networks, formal
and informal, have sprung up for the marketing and distribution of -
software. In many of these relationships, the developer of a program
retains ownership of the program and all intellectual property rights in
the program, licensing certain reproduction, marketing, and distribu-
tion rights to one or several intermediaries.4 Typically, intermediaries,
end-users, or consumers are granted "licenses" to use the software
rather than ownership of the software.5
Should one of the parties to a software distribution or license agree-
ment go into bankruptcy, the agreement will likely be deemed an exec-
utory contract rejectable or assumable by the debtor with bankruptcy
court approval.6 Since the Fourth Circuit's 1985 decision in Lubrizol
* Associate professor, Georgia State University College of Law; B.A., 1973, Duke
University; J.D., 1976, Yale University.
1. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF COMPUTERS AND BUSINESS EQUIP.,
A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1984) [hereinafter DET. OF
COMMERCE].
2. See id. at 24.
3. Id. at iv.
4. See infra Section I.
5. See infra Section I.C.
6. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); infra Section II (discussion of § 365).
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Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.),7 several commentators have expressed concern
for the plight of an intellectual property licensee whose licensor goes
into bankruptcy and rejects the license agreement.8 Of most concern
was the possibility that rejection would leave the licensee without
rights to the technology on which the business depends.9 Congress
recently passed legislation to protect such licensees, giving them the
right to retain the licensed intellectual property rights even after rejec-
tion of the license agreement in the licensor's bankruptcy.' °
Little has been written on the reverse-Lubrizol situation, licensee
bankruptcy, a matter not dealt with by the new legislation." This
Article will consider the effects of licensee bankruptcy on the licensor,
why the licensor might wish to avoid executory contract treatment in
a licensee bankruptcy, and what the licensor can do to avoid such
treatment.
I. SOFTWARE LICENSES
A. The Nature of Software and Its Legal Protection
Originally, computer manufacturers such as IBM supplied pro-
grams for their machines to computer buyers or lessees without extra
or separate charge.' 2  Users created their own programs to fill their
7. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
8. E.g., Dobb, Source Code Escrows and the Bankruptcy Code: Legal Issues and Proposed
Structure ofAgreements, 4 COMPUTER L.A. BULL., Winter 1988, at 4; Feldman, Bankruptcy and
Software Licenses: Some Proposed Drafting Solutions, 4 COMPUTER LAW, May 1987, at 13;
Hemnes & Montgomery, The Bankruptcy Code, the Copyright Act, and Transactions in Computer
Software, 7 COMPUTER/LAW J. 327 (1987); Meadows, Lubrizol: What Will It Mean for the
Software Industry, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 311 (1987); Warden &
Costello, Technology Licensing: Protecting Licensees Against the Risk of the Licensor's Insolvency,
3 CAL. Bus. L. PRAC. 57 (1988); Note, Rejection of Computer Software Licensing Agreements in
Bankruptcy, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 361 (1986).
9. See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. Senator DeConcini, introducing legislation to protect
licensees in licensor bankruptcies, stated that recent court decisions had turned licensing
agreements into "really nothing more than a promise that can be broken." 133 CONG. REC.
S11,653 (daily ed. August 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
10. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538
(1988). See generally Hemnes, Computer Software Licensing After the Enactment of the
Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, 5 COMPUTER LAW, Oct. 1988, at 7.
11. Cf Lieb, The Interface of Trademark and Bankruptcy Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 307
(1988); Morris & Arnold, Protection of Interests in Licensed or Assigned Intellectual Property, 69
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 525 (1987) (on the interface of patent and bankruptcy law).
12. Freed, Legal Interests Related to Software Programs, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 347, 359 (1985).
A computer solves problems by following detailed instructions. Although a computer cannot
think, it can execute correctly written instructions much faster than a person can. The
instructions, called programs, must be written with great precision, and they must be written in a
form of notation-code-that a computer can mechanically comprehend. Computer programs
500
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special needs. 3 Then firms began supplying software programs sepa-
rately from the hardware. 4 When microcomputers and personal com-
puters hit the consumer market in the 1970's, both the software
market and the number of suppliers increased dramatically. 15
Software now in existence ranges from custom-designed software for
main-frame computers to "shrink-wrapped" mass-marketed software
sold in retail stores. 16
and related materials such as documentation, flow charts, and user manuals, are generally
referred to as "software." See, e.g., S. ALAGIC & M. ARBIB, THE DESIGN OF WELL-
STRUCTURED AND CORRECT PROGRAMS 1 (1978); R. SALTMAN, COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER-
READABLE WORKS 59 (1977).
Documentation includes the developer's comments on the program's operation and
instructions for users. For a more detailed discussion of the term "software," see Freed, supra;
Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 484-88
(1981). For a more detailed discussion of programs and how they are written, see Brinson,
Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression from Unprotected Ideas, A Starting
Point, 29 B.C.L. REv. 803 (1988).
Personal computers are usually sold with operating systems already in place inside. Operating
systems programs coordinate the functioning of the hardware, manage the internal flow of data
within the computer, and enable the computer's user to use task-specific programs called
applications programs. Examples of operating systems programs include Data General's RDOS
and Microsoft's MS-DOS. Operating systems software is frequently placed on semi-conductor
chips (ROMs) and installed into the computer's circuitry. The user of the computer adds
applications programs to perform specific tasks-word processing, accounting, or game-playing,
for example. Applications programs are written for use with a specific operating systems
program. Because there is no industry-wide standard on the configuration of operating systems
programs, applications programs written to work with the operating systems program of a given
computer generally will not work on a computer using a different operating systems program.
See, eg., Grogan & Kump, The Broader Meanings of Apple v. Franklin in the Development of
Compatible Operating Systems and in Determining Standards for Injunctive Relief 1985
COMPUTER LAW ANN. 105, 106-07.
"Compatibility" refers to the ability of a particular computer to run, without modifications,
applications systems programs written for the more popular lines of computers such as IBM's
PC. Another computer manufacturer may view "IBM compatibility" as highly desirable, since
compatibility will ensure that the many application programs already in existence for the IBM
PC will be available for purchasers of this other computer.
13. Freed, supra note 12, at 359.
14. Id.
15. For the historical perspective, see Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663,
672-76.
16. The shrink-wrapped plastic covering the box of disks usually includes a label stating that
opening the plastic wrapper constitutes the user's acceptance of the restrictive terms stated on the
notice. For a more extensive discussion of the enforceability of the shrink wrap, see Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a Louisiana law purporting to
validate shrink wraps was preempted by federal copyright law); Kemp, Mass Marketed Software:
The Legality of the Form License Agreement, 48 LA. L. REV. 87 (1987); Stern, Shrink-Wrap
Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark, I1
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51 (1985). For more on the growth of the U.S. software
industry, see DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 1.
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Software, once developed, is easily duplicated mechanically in a
process much like recording a phonorecord onto a cassette tape. Most
operating systems allow users to copy a program in a matter of
seconds.' 7 While the ease of copying software is a concern for those
fearing bootlegging and home copying,' 8 easy software duplication
facilitates the distribution of existing software.
Early suppliers of software usually relied on trade secrets doctrine
to protect their proprietary information.1 9 Trade secret protection,
which arises under state law, allows owners of a trade secret to enjoin
the unauthorized use or disclosure of their trade secret.20 The owner,
to retain the rights in the trade secret, must keep the material secret,
which requires control of dissemination.2 ' In addition, trade secrets
law allows the owner of a trade secret to make the secrets known to
others subject to the user's promise not to disclose the secrets.2 2
Rather than selling the programs, software suppliers, reflecting the
established practice of trade secrets licensing of information relating to
industrial processes, licensed the use of programs.
23
Today, software suppliers rely not only on trade secrets doctrine to
protect their products, 24 but also on copyright law.2 The exclusive
rights of copyright2 6 give the creator of a computer program or other
work valuable protection against the work's unauthorized duplication
17. More detail on the mechanics of duplication can be found in Nimmer & Krauthaus,
Copyright and Software Technology Infringement: Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62
IND. L.J. 13, 22 (1986); and in Samuelson, supra note 15, at 689-90.
18. For more information on the seriousness of the piracy problem, see DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 51-52.
19. Freed, supra note 12, at 359. On trade secrets, see generally R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON
TRADE SECRETS (1988).
20. See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 1.01. The right to prevent unauthorized use or
disclosure does not allow the owner to prevent independent development by others. 2 R.
MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 12.02[2], at 12-28.
21. 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 19, §§ 2.03-2.05; Freed, supra note 12, at 359.
22. 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 3.01.
23. Freed, supra note 12, at 359. See generally I R. MILGRIM, supra note 19, § 1.06.
24. See, e.g., T. SMEDINGHOFF, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO DEVELOPING, PROTECTING, AND
MARKETING SOFTWARE (1986); Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of
Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1985); Gilburne & Johnston, Trade
Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mfass Mfarket, 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 211
(1982).
25. See, e.g., Brinson, supra note 12; Conley & Bryan, supra note 24; Davidson, Protecting
Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337 (1983). Large suppliers of
programs may have feared that their wide-spread distribution of products might threaten trade
secrets protection. See Freed, supra note 12, at 360. See generally 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 19,
§ 2.05[2]. Patent protection is available for programs that meet patent law standards. See
generally Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986).
26. See Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
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and distribution.27 The federal copyright statute28 confers on the
copyright owner five exclusive rights over the protected work. The
three exclusive rights most applicable to software are the right to
reproduce, or copy, the work; the right to distribute copies to the pub-
lic by sale, rental, lease, or loan; and the right to prepare derivative
works based on the protected work.29 One who exercises one of these
exclusive rights without the copyright owner's permission is an
infringer,3" and becomes liable to the copyright owner for damages
and for profits stemming from the unauthorized use.31
Copyright protection arises automatically when an original work is
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.32 Registration is not
required to create protection, although registration is a prerequisite for
bringing an infringement action.33 The work's author initially owns
the copyright,34 although the author may transfer or assign ownership
to another. Most works created by employees as part of their jobs
are "works made for hire,"36 and by law the employer is deemed both
27. See, eg., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983). See generally I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 2.04[C] (1988). For a summary of the history of the copyrightability of programs, see Brinson,
supra note 12, at 807-09, and the works cited therein.
28. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988). The copyright statute was recently
amended by the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988). The amendments primarily eliminate copyright formalities, for the Berne
Convention provides that "the enjoyment and the exercise of [copyright] shall not be subject to
any formality." See S. REP. No. 352, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3706, 3716.
29. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977). The other two exclusive rights are the rights of
public performance and of public display. Id.
30. Id. § 501(a). The copyright owner's exclusive rights must give way to "fair use" by
others. The fair use doctrine, developed judicially, appears in the statute as § 107. Sections 108-
118 of the statute add further details concerning particular permitted uses.
31. Id. §§ 504, 505. International protection for the works of American authors is provided
through U.S. participation in the Universal Copyright Convention (ratified by the Senate in
1955) and in the Berne Convention (ratified by the Senate on October 20, 1988). On these two
conventions, see generally S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS, chs. 5-6 (1983).
32. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1977).
33. Id. §§ 411, 501(b). Registration procedures are set out in §§ 408-412. Early registration
offers certain procedural benefits to the owner. See id. §§ 410(c), 412, 504, 505. Registration is
not a prerequisite for a suit for infringement of a Berne Convention work whose country of origin
is not the United States. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, § 9(b), Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2859.
34. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 1977).
35. See id. § 201(d).
36. Id. § 101 defines "work made for hire."
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the author37 and the copyright owner3 8 unless the employee and the
employer have agreed otherwise in a signed written document.39
B. The Marketing and Distribution of Software in the United States
The developer of a software program may consider several alterna-
tives in marketing and distributing the product. First, the developer
may choose to market the product itself, dealing directly with end-
users through either advertising, direct mail solicitation, or an in-
house sales force. Marketing and advertising are expensive,4° though,
and a single developer or small firm41 may lack the necessary
resources for a national marketing effort. Such a deVeloper may
choose instead to market the product through intermediaries or
wholesalers, who then supply the product to retail dealers. Other
options include dealing directly with dealers, and dealing with fran-
chisees who supply the product to either dealers or end-users.
A software developer may wish to turn the reproduction and pack-
aging of the product, as well as the marketing, over to a third party.
Such a developer might enter into a software publishing agreement,
similar in some respects to a book publishing agreement.4 a In the
alternative, the developer might convey all rights in the product to an
established software publisher.43 Software publishers who might be
interested in taking over the duplication and marketing include
independent software suppliers;' hardware manufacturers, which are
generally not able to internally develop software to meet all the
applications software needs of their buyers;45 and traditional book
37. Id. § 201(b).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. One survey showed that software companies in the business and professional segment of
the personal computer market spend more of their revenues on marketing and advertising than
they do on research and development and maintenance. That study estimated that marketing
costs accounted for 35% of the firms' revenues. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 10, 16.
41. As of 1984, many of the independent software suppliers were relatively small firms. Id.
at 5. Besides the independent developers, software developers include computer manufacturers,
semiconductor manufacturers, and telecommunications firms. Id. at 4.
42. Publishers of software frequently distribute under their brands not just software they own,
but software for which they have only marketing rights. See generally Hansen, Software
Distribution, Remarketing, and Publishing Agreements, 4 COMPUTER/LAW J. 625 (1984). In
addition, the major personal computer software firms publish and distribute software developed
by outside developers.
43. See infra notes 58-61, 70 and accompanying text (discussing copyright assignments).
44. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1130
(N.D. Cal. 1986). Other examples of independent software suppliers are Claris and Ashton-Tate.
45. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 63.
504
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publishing firms.46 Some developers and publishers distribute their
products through networks of hardware vendors and other software
vendors as well as through their own distribution channels.47
Finally, it is possible that the software developer's product will be
integrated with either hardware or another developer's software, or
both, and sold to end-users as part of an integrated system of compo-
nents. A product bundler is sometimes referred to as "value-added
reseller" ("VAR").4 8 VAR firms sell integrated computer systems to
end-users, usually end-users in specific market segments-for example,
physicians, or a particular type of retail establishment. 9 VAR firms
are independent, unaffiliated with the hardware manufacturers whose
products they handle." They generally bundle hardware with limited-
application software and support services. 5 '
This brief survey of software distribution channels is not meant to
be exhaustive. Other avenues certainly exist for distribution-con-
tracts with the U.S. Department of Defense,52 cross-licensing agree-
ments between two developers, 53 and venture capital and partnership
agreements, 54 to name a few.
C. Software License Agreements
Fortunately for developers who want outsiders to handle software
distribution, copyright law 55 permits the copyright owner to authorize
others to exercise the exclusive rights of copyright.56 The copyright
statute gives the copyright owner several options. First, if the
copyright owner wishes to assign all rights in the protected work to
46. Id. at 5 (naming McGraw-Hill as one example of a book publishing firm that develops
software).
47. Hansen, supra note 42, at 632.
48. 1 R. BIGELOW, COMPUTER CONTRACTS, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING GUIDE
§ 1.06[2], at 1-17 (1987). Other names used for the bundlers are "original equipment
manufacturer" ("OEM") and "integrated systems organization" ("ISO"). "VAR" is generally
used where the end-product is a personal computer sold by retail stores. Id.
49. F. COOPER III, LAW AND THE SOFTWARE MARKETER 2 (1988).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2-3.
52. See Deasy & Martin, Seeking the Balance Between Government and Industry Interests in
Software Acquisition, 14 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 159 (1988).
53. See Testimony of Thomas M.S. Hemnes Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary Regarding H.R. 4657, June 3,
1988, at 8, Appendix A (copy of written testimony on file at Washington Law Review).
54. See F. COOPER III, supra note 49, at 187-89.
55. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
56. See id. § 106 (West 1977) (stating in part that "[tihe owner of copyright , . .has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the ... following ...." (emphasis added)).
505
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someone else, he or she can transfer the copyright ownership.57 This
transfer of all copyright rights is generally referred to as an assignment
of the copyright.58 If the copyright owner wants to transfer only the
public distribution right,5 9 while retaining the reproduction and deriv-
ative works rights, 60 the owner can do so. 61 Another option is con-
veying part ownership in the copyright or in particular exclusive rights
to a joint venturer or partner.62
Frequently the developer of software wishes to retain ownership of
all copyright rights, granting permission to other entities to do certain
things-reproduce and distribute the software, for example-that
would otherwise be an infringement of the developer's copyright.63
The copyright owner's grant of permission is, in copyright terminol-
ogy, a license. 64 A copyright licensee could thus, without fear of being
deemed an infringer, exercise the licensed rights.65
A software distributor will need a copyright license authorizing it to
publicly distribute the protected software. A software publisher-
distributor will need a license for both the distribution and the repro-
duction rights. The developer, by granting a copyright license, gives
57. See id. § 201(d)(1) (providing in part that "ownership of a copyright may be transferred
in whole or in part by any means of conveyance").
58. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.01[A], at 10-5 to 10-6.
59. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West 1977).
60. Id. § 106 (1), (2).
61. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d) (West 1977) reads as follows:
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of
conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of
any ... of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1)
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent
of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this
title.
62. Id. § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part
.... .(emphasis added)).
63. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
64. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977) (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership"); id.
§ 205(f) (West 1977) (recodified as 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(e) (West Supp. 1989) under § 5 of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857); 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.01[A], at 10-4 to 10-5 & 10-5 n.10.
65. The importance of clearly defining the license's scope is readily seen in a pending case,
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 88 20149 RPA (N.D. Cal.). The case involves a
question of whether a license granted by the plaintiff to defendant Microsoft in settlement of a
legal dispute was a grant of permission by the plaintiff covering some of the complained-of acts of
Microsoft. See Defendant Microsoft's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims, fr 25-
31 (Apr. 7, 1988). The district court granted Apple a partial summary judgment in March 1989,
finding that Microsoft's acts exceeded the license granted by Apple. See Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., No. C 88 20149 WWS (N.D. Cal.), Memorandum of Decision and Order (Mar.
20, 1989).
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the necessary permission. The developer may choose to grant the
same rights to several different entities, carving out no special geo-
graphic distribution areas or target markets for any one licensee. Such
licenses are called "nonexclusive licenses."66 If the developer gives
instead grants of permission that do not overlap-for example, public
distribution rights to Distributor 1 for all states east of the Mississippi,
public distribution rights to Distributor 2 for all other states; or public
distribution rights in the nation-wide physician market to Marketer 1,
distribution rights in the insurance company market to Marketer 2-
each licensee has an exclusive license.67 The licensee who receives the
developer's commitment to refrain from granting any other licenses
also has an exclusive license, as does the licensee of a particular right
who receives the developer's commitment against licensing that partic-
ular right to anyone else.68 Most existing nonexclusive licenses could
be restated as exclusive distribution licenses limited to a particular
time, area, or type of end-user.69
According to the copyright statute, an exclusive license, even if lim-
ited in time or place of effect, is a "transfer of copyright ownership,"
as is an assignment of copyright.7 ° A "transfer" is not valid unless the
instrument of conveyance is in writing and signed by the copyright
owner or owner's agent.71 A "transfer"-an assignment or exclusive
license-can be recorded in the Copyright Office.72 Recordation pro-
tects the assignee's or exclusive licensee's rights by serving as construc-
tive notice to all others of the transfer.73 Should the copyright owner
66. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.02[A]. The term appears in the statute at 17
U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977) (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership") and § 205(f)
(§ 205(e) (West Supp. 1989) following amendment by § 5 of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857, but the term is not
defined in Title 17.
67. See Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Economics Co., 548 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 10.02.
Territorial allocations are common in software distribution, as are end-user market limitations,
such as the grant of authorization to a dealer to market to dentists and doctors but not to HMO's
or hospitals. Hansen, supra note 42, at 641.
68. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.02[B], at 10-21.
69. Id. at 10-22.
70. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977) defines "transfer of copyright ownership" as including
"an exclusive license... whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license." See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, §§ 10.02, 10.03. There is no
parallel in patent law or trade secrets doctrine.
71. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1977).
72. Id. § 205(a).
73. Id. § 205(c). In order to serve as constructive notice, the recorded transfer document
must identify the work to which it pertains, and that work must be registered in the Copyright
Office. For problems caused by the registration requirement see Hemnes & Montgomery, supra
note 8, at 377-78; Nimmer & Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information Property Rights, 2
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make a second transfer that conflicts with the rights already granted,
the transfer first executed prevails if the first transfer was recorded in
the manner required to give constructive notice74 before the recorda-
tion of the later transfer. 5 If the first transfer is recorded within one
month of its execution, 76 it will still prevail over a second transfer
made and recorded within that month.7 7 If the first transfer is not
recorded within the one-month grace period, the later transfer, if
recorded prior to the recordation of the first transfer, will prevail over
the first transfer." The statute does not appear to contemplate the
possibility that both of the conflicting transfers will be unrecorded.7 9
A nonexclusive license is not a transfer of copyright ownership 8°
and need not be in writing to be valid.8' While a nonexclusive license
can be recorded, 2 recordation makes no difference in determining
rights against later transferees of copyright ownership.8 3 The nonex-
clusive license, recorded or not, if in a written instrument signed by
the copyright owner and granted before the transfer of ownership,
prevails over the conflicting transfer.84
HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 205-06 (1988); Note, Transfers of Copyrights for Security Under the New
Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125, 130-32 (1978).
74. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.07.
75. 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(e) (West 1977). Prior to the effective date of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, recordation was a prerequisite to an infringement suit by one
"claiming by virtue of a transfer to be the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right." Id.
§ 205(d). Section 5 of the Berne Implementation Act strikes subsection (d) from § 205, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857, in order to bring U.S. copyright law into compliance with
Berne's requirement that "the enjoyment and the exercise of [copyright] shall not be subject to
any formality." S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 3706, 3716; see also supra note 28.
76. The grace period is two months for transfers executed outside the United States. 17
U.S.C.A. § 205(e) (West 1977) (recodified as § 205(d) (West Supp. 1989) by § 5 of the Berne
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857). The applicability of
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) to failure to record the transfer of copyright is discussed infra note
224.
77. 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(e) (West 1977) (recodified as § 205(d) (West Supp. 1989) by § 5 of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. § 101 (West 1977) (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership").
81. See id. § 204(a).
82. See id. § 205(a) ("Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a
copyright may be recorded.").
83. See id. § 205(f) (recodified as § 205(e) (West Supp. 1989) by § 5 of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857).
84. Id. The nonexelusive license also prevails over the transfer if the license was taken in
good faith before the transfer was recorded and without notice of the transfer. Id.
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While software publishing and distribution agreements 85 will neces-
sarily involve some licensing of copyright rights,86 the copyright
license aspect of the agreement, whether or not a "transfer" of copy-
right ownership, does not convey any rights in the tangible object,
such as a diskette or a silicon chip,87 containing the program.88 A
publishing or distribution agreement will generally include some pro-
vision expressly or impliedly granting to the publisher/distributor
ownership or possession rights in the software.89 The licensing agree-
ments generally provide possession rather than ownership to the pub-
lisher/distributor.90 The proper term for the grant of personal
property possession rights in the publishing and distribution agree-
ments appears to be "lease," not "license." 91
The agreements under which end-users of software acquire their
rights in the software are also generally referred to as licenses,
although most are, if not sales, technically leases of personal property
containing software. 92 Custom-ordered software is usually protected
under true trade secrets licenses. 93 The owner of trade secrets may
make his protected material available to others subject to use restric-
tions. 94 Mass-marketed software, like Lotus 1-2-3 or WordPerfect, is
"licensed" according to so-called "shrink-wrap" license agreements
purportedly giving only use rights to the consumer and containing
85. So-called "end-user licenses," also known as "shrink-wraps," a special situation, are
discussed infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
86. For examples, see 2 R. BIGELOW, supra note 48, Form 12.07-1; T. SMEDINGHOFF, supra
note 24, at A.9. Such agreements may also involve the licensing of trade secrets.
87. Use of a tangible item, such as a diskette or a silicon chip, is only one method of providing
software programs. Programs can also be provided by transmitting electronic pulses over
telephone lines to the computer, a process called "down-loading" or "downline loading." Freed,
supra note 12, at 356, 362.
88. 17 U.S.C.A. § 202 (West 1977) provides, in part, that a transfer of copyright or any of the
copyright rights does not convey property rights in a material object. Cf Harris v. Emus
Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (bankruptcy sale purchaser of master
recording of musical composition does not acquire copyright license to reproduce the musical
works); Kingsrow Enters., Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(foreclosure sale buyer of videotapes held not to have acquired the copyright rights needed for
public distribution of the films).
89. For examples, see 2 R. BIGELOW, supra note 48, Form 12.07-1, at 12-262-12-263; T.
SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 24, at A.9, 3.
90. Transfer of ownership of the tangible personal property would give the transferee the
right to sell or rent that copy. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988) (transferee can
"otherwise dispose of the possession of" the copy). Early software transactions were set up as
trade secrets licenses, Freed, supra note 12, at 359, and outright sales might threaten trade secret
protection. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
91. F. COOPER, supra note 49, at 12.
92. Id; see Freed, supra note 12, at 372.
93. Freed, supra note 12, at 359-60.
94. Id. at 364.
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prohibitions against copying, reverse-engineering, rental, and transfer
of the software. 95 Publishers and distributors of mass-marketed
software usually have only the right of sublicensing the use of the
software to end-users. Whether these "licenses" are really distinguish-
able from outright sales to consumers is questionable.9 6 If the transac-
tions are really sales of personal property, the restrictions on transfer
and rental are probably invalid, for the owner of the tangible object
containing copyrighted material has the right to transfer that object.97
In addition, the owner of a copy of a computer program has the right
to make a copy or adaptation of that program if the copy or adapta-
tion is either "created as an essential step in the utilization of the com-
puter program in conjunction with a machine" 9 or for archival
purposes only.99
II. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY:
THE BASICS
According to section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
("Bankruptcy Code"),"° a bankruptcy trustee,'0 ' subject to the
court's approval and to other limitations, "may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."'0 2 According to
95. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit
held that a Louisiana statute validating shrink wrap licenses was preempted by federal copyright
law.
96. See Freed, supra note 12, at 372-74; Kemp, supra note 16, at 95; Stern, supra note 16, at
55.
97. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 1977); see Freed, supra note 12, at 364. See generally F.
COOPER III, supra note 49, at 181.
98. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 1977).
99. Id. See generally Stem, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of Software Users'
Rights or an Illusory Promise, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (1985).
100. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(a) (West Supp. 1989). The current bankruptcy statute, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) ("Bankruptcy Code"),
took effect on October 1, 1979. The Code was amended in 1984 and in 1986. Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; Bankruptcy
Judges, United States Trustee, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
100 Stat. 3088.
101. On the trustee's duties, see generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ch. 704 (L. King,
15th ed. 1979). In a Chapter 7 "liquidation" bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors of the debtor
have the option of electing a trustee or permitting the interim trustee chosen by the United States
trustee to serve as trustee. 11 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). A person may serve as
a trustee only if he is "'competent to perform the duties of trustee." Id. § 321(a)(1) (West Supp.
1989). In a Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy, the debtor serves as the trustee, see id.
§ 1107(a), as "debtor in possession," unless the bankruptcy court orders the appointment of an
outside trustee for cause. Id. § 1104 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
102. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West Supp. 1989). The limitations appear in subparts (b), (c), and
(d) of § 365. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, "' 365.01-.12,
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1974),
510
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one legal scholar who has written in this area, Professor Vern Coun-
tryman, the notion that the trustee should be able to either assume or
reject an executory contract can be traced back to the abandonment
doctrine, which permitted a trustee to abandon worthless or burden-
some property in the debtor's estate.1"3
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "executory con-
tract."1 °4 The definition put forth by Professor Countryman-"a con-
tract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt" 5 and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other" 1 6-- has been adopted by many
courts, 10 7 although some courts have considered whether contracts
fully performed on one side should be treated as executory.10 8  Still
other courts have rejected the Countryman definition in favor of a pol-
icy-oriented approach. 10 9 Countryman reasoned that a contract in
which only the debtor has outstanding obligations as of the bank-
ruptcy filing should simply give the nondebtor a claim in the debtor's
bankruptcy. 10 While such contracts are executory in a broad sense,
Countryman felt that they should not be treated as executory
[hereinafter Countryman I]; Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Countryman II]; Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1980); Nimmer, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. CoLo. L. REv. 507 (1983).
For a somewhat different perspective, see Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. CoLo. L. REV. 845 (1988).
103. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 440-47; Countryman II, supra note 102, at 479 &
n.220. For the history of statutory provisions concerning executory contracts, see Countryman I,
supra note 102, at 447-50.
104. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); id. § 365.
105. The Bankruptcy Code, unlike the predecessor statute, the 1898 bankruptcy statute,
generally referred to now as the "Bankruptcy Act," uses the word "debtor" rather than
"bankrupt." See id. § 101(12) (West 1979). Countryman wrote his two-part article on executory
contracts while the Act was still in effect. The Code replaced the Act as of October 1, 1979.
106. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 460.
107. E.g., Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d
1020, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Select-A-Seat Corp. (Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver), 625 F.2d 290,
292 (9th Cir. 1980); Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1979).
108. E.g., In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224, 228 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984).
109. See generally Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 223, 246-59 (1981) (urging the use of "flexible guidelines" to determine whether a
contract is executory).
110. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 451. A claim is a "right to payment," whether
"reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1979).
A right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance is also a claim if the breach gives rise
to a right to payment. Id.
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:499, 1989
contracts in bankruptcy."' A contract fully performed by the debtor
is, in Countryman's view, an asset in the estate of the debtor rather
than an executory contract." 2 Countryman's examples of contracts
considered executory for bankruptcy purposes include: First, a con-
tract in which the debtor had, as of the bankruptcy commencement,
an obligation to perform construction work in exchange for progress
payments by the customer; second, a contract to sell the debtor's busi-
ness, where the debtor still had to provide consulting and both parties
had outstanding payment obligations; and third, a contract to build a
shopping center, under which the debtor was obligated to supply
money and the other party to supply services." 13 In contrast, a con-
struction contract in which the nondebtor contractor has substantially
performed should be treated as a claim by the contractor rather than
as an executory contract."
14
Although the Code's provision on executory contracts" 5 indicates
that a trustee's wish to assume or reject an executory contract must be
approved by the bankruptcy court," 6 the Code does not provide any
standards for the court to apply in reviewing the trustee's request."'
Whether the trustee chooses to assume or reject the contract, the
nondebtor party may dislike or oppose the trustee's choice. That the
rejection or assumption decision might adversely affect the nondebtor
is, according to some courts, irrelevant." 8 Although some courts
111. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 451-52, 458.
112. Id. at 458. The commencement of a bankruptcy case "creates an estate." I I U.S.C.A.
§ 541(a) (West Supp. 1987). The estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencemcnt of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1) (West 1979). In a Chapter 7 case,
the property of the estate, except for the exempt property which the debtor gets to keep, see id.
§ 522 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987), is used to pay the holders of claims (the prebankruptcy
creditors). See id. § 704 (West Supp. 1989); id. § 726 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). In a Chapter
I1 case, the property of the estate is, in a sense, the capital for the debtor's attempt to reorganize.
See id. § 1121 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); id. § 1123; id. § 1129.
113. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 461, 462 & nn.88, 90, 91.
114. Id. at 457. For a survey of Code-era executory contract cases see Fogel, supra note 102,
and Recent Development, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Section 365, 3 BANKR.
DEv. L.J. 217 (1986).
115. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
116. Id. § 365(a) (West Supp. 1989). In a Chapter 7 case, if the trustee does not assume or
reject the executory contract within 60 days of the order for relief (defined as the filing of the
petition in a voluntary case, id. § 301 (West 1979)), the contract is deemed rejected. Id.
§ 365(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The court may, for cause, extend the time for action. In a
Chapter 11, the trustee may assume or reject an executory contract at any time up to the
confirmation of the plan of reorganization, id. § 365(d)(2), unless the court orders the trustee to
act within a specified time. Id.
117. See II U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
118. E.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 72 Bankr. 845, 847 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). But see In re
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restrict the section 365 rejection right to contracts that are burden-
some to the estate of the debtor, 119 many others defer to the trustee's
"business judgment," relying on the trustee's judgment in choosing the
most beneficial executory contract treatment.120 The "business judg-
ment" standard appears to be the standard most applied by the bank-
ruptcy courts.12'
The trustee cannot reject parts of the contract and assume others. If
he assumes the executory contract, he must accept it in its entirety.122
If the bankruptcy court allows rejection, that decision is a fact deter-
mination123 reviewable by a higher court only under the "clearly erro-
neous" review standard.124 The court-approved rejection becomes a
breach of contract,' 25 and the nondebtor has a claim in bankruptcy for
H.M. Bowness, Inc., 89 Bankr. 238, 241-42 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Petur U.S.A. Instr.
Co., 35 Bankr. 561, 563-64 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (refusing to allow rejection).
119. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 365.03, at 365-16.
120. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, at f 365.03, at 365-18. That treatise traces
the use of the business judgment test in executory contract rejection decisions back to Group of
Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943), a railroad
reorganization case. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 365.03, at 365-16. In
corporate law the business judgment rule protects decisions of the corporation's governing body
from second-guessing by the judiciary. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1984). According to one bankruptcy court, the "business judgment test" is not a "strict standard
to meet... [but merely] requires a showing by the trustee or Debtor-in-Possession that rejection
of the contract will be likely to benefit the estate." In re W. & L. Assocs., Inc., 71 Bankr. 962,
966 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). But see .M. Bowness, 89 Bankr. at 241-42; Infosystems
Technology, Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., C.A. No. 87-0042 (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6285, 1987
WL 13805) (D. Mass. June 25, 1987); Petur, 35 Bankr. at 563-64.
121. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 365.03, at 365-18; Nimmer, supra note
102, at 519. Collective bargaining agreements are an exception; rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in Chapter I 1 proceedings are now subject to a special statutory standard set out in
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 101, 365.03[1], at 365-18 (discussion of the judicially-created standards for rejection
of collective bargaining agreements).
122. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 365.03, at 365-15; Fogel, supra note 102,
at 376 & nn.148-50.
123. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers (In re Richmond Metal Finishers), 756
F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985).
124. Id. (reversing the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court). The district court's
decision appears at 38 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) and the bankruptcy court's original
decision at 34 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983), later op., 36 Bankr. 270 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1984).
125. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(g) (West Supp. 1989).
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breach of contract damages.' 26 However, the nondebtor cannot get
specific performance on the contract.' 27
If the trustee assumes a contract in which the debtor has not
defaulted, court approval is generally granted 2 ' so long as the con-
tract does not involve nondelegable duties.'29 While few cases concern
nondelegable, nonassumable executory contracts, 30  commentators
agree that a contract requiring one party to perform unique personal
services is an example of a nondelegable contract not assumable in
bankruptcy.'13 Contract language prohibiting assumption or assign-
ment is, apparently, irrelevant in the determination of whether a con-
tract is assumable in bankruptcy.3 2
Why might the nondebtor object to the assumption of a contract?
As one commentator has noted, the nondebtor party may simply
regret having entered into the contract because market changes have
rendered performance undesirable. 133 Beyond that, assumption of the
contract by the trustee is not outright performance, but a new promise
to perform, a promise made in a context-bankruptcy, whether liqui-
dation or reorganization-different from the initial contract's
126. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 365.08, at 365-51; Fogel, supra note 102,
at 377-79. Real property leases and installment land sales contracts are dealt with separately, in
§ 365(h) and (j), as are licensees covered by the new intellectual property legislation. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
127. Real estate lessees may remain in possession of the leased premises and licensees may
continue to use the licensed technology if they wish, so long as they comply with certain
conditions. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h), (j) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
128. See generally Nimmer, supra note 102, at 531-33. But see li re Kent, 91 Bankr. I
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (court refused to allow assumption of contract to sell real estate where
contract price was less than market value of property).
129. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989) states that the trustee cannot assume or
assign a contract if applicable law would excuse the nondebtor from accepting performance from
a substitute party. As one commentator has noted, the reference in § 365(c) to "applicable law
[that] excuses [the nondebtor from accepting performance from] an entity other than the debtor
or the debtor in possession" is unclear, but has been held to incorporate common law concepts of
nondelegable duties. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 537. A contract to make a loan, extend
financial accommodations, or issue a security is also nonassumable, II U.S.C.A. § 365(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1989), as is a lease of nonresidential real property that has been terminated prior to
the order for relief. Id. § 36 5(c)(3).
130. The Collier treatise, citing three cases, states that "'[s]everal appellate decisions have
found that the reference to applicable law in section 365(c) includes situations in which state or
federal law can be said to bar assignment." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, C
365.05, at 365-43.
131 Id. C 365.05, at 365-42; Countryman II, supra note 102, at 482-84, 498-501; Fogel, supra
note 102, at 351; Nimmer, supra note 102, at 537; see 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(c) (West Supp. 1989).
stating, in part, that "[the trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract ... whether
or not such contract . . prohibits assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if [applicable law
excuses the nondebtor from accepting performance from a third party]."
132. See II U.S.C.A. § 365(c), (f) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
133. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 532.
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context.' 34 From the nondebtor's viewpoint, the likelihood of the
trustee or debtor in possession actually performing must be evaluated
in light of the debtor's financial difficulties.135 Also, performance will
be rendered by an entity different from the party with whom the
nondebtor originally negotiated, 136 because postbankruptcy manage-
ment generally changes and then becomes subject to the limitations
and goals of bankruptcy. 1
37
If the debtor defaults on the executory contract, the trustee may not
assume the contract without cure, or at least adequate assurance, of
cure, of all defaults; compensation of the nondebtor for actual pecuni-
ary loss resulting from the default, or adequate assurance of compen-
sation; and adequate assurance of future performance on the
contract.' 38 It is important to remember that while the Code gives the
trustee the right to assume even a contract on which the debtor
defaulted, the trustee cannot assume a contract which has either
expired by its terms or terminated before the filing of bankruptcy. 139
Though section 365(a) states that the trustee's options regarding an
executory contract are to "assume or reject," 140 section 365(f)
expands the trustee's options to include assignment of an assumed
contract,14 ' provided that there is adequate assurance of future per-
formance by the assignee.' 42 The trustee may not assign an executory
contract if applicable law excuses the nondebtor from accepting per-
formance from, or rendering performance to, an entity other than the
debtor or debtor in possession. 143 A "no assignments" clause, permit-
ting termination of the contract by the nonassigning party on account
134. Id. at 533.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989). A default on a contract clause relating to
the filing of bankruptcy or to insolvency or financial condition of the debtor while the bankruptcy
is pending need not be cured. Id. § 365(b)(2). "Adequate assurance" of future performance is
not required for assumption if the debtor is not in default. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 101, at 365-36; Nimmer, supra note 102, at 533.
139. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, at 365-37; Countryman II, supra note 102,
at 506, 511-13; Fogel, supra note 102, at 354-55; Nimmer, supra note 102, at 542-43. The
distinction between pre-bankruptcy termination and invalid ipso facto ("bankruptcy") clauses is
discussed infra Section V.
140. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(a) (West Supp. 1989).
141. See id. § 365(f) (West 1979).
142. Id. § 365(f)(2)(B).
143. Id. § 365(c) (West Supp. 1989); id. § 365(f)(1) (West 1979).
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of an attempted assignment, is of no effect.' 4 4 Assignment relieves
both the debtor's estate and the trustee from liability for post-assign-
ment breach by the assignee. 45
Why might the nondebtor object to assignment? In some contracts
the identity of the parties to the contract is an important part of the
bargain. 4 6  Outside the bankruptcy context, a "no assignments"
clause may increase the value of the contractual commitments by giv-
ing the parties assurance against having to render performance to, or
accepting performance from, a substitute. 147 Furthermore, even if the
nondebtor is willing to consider an assignment, under section 365 the
court, not the nondebtor party, decides whether assurances of the pro-
posed assignee's future performance are adequate. 14
8
In general, the nondebtor party has two avenues for eliminating the
possibility of a contract being deemed executory in the other party's
bankruptcy: Completing performance on the contract149 or terminat-
ing the contract before the other party files for bankruptcy. Once the
other party to the contract has filed for bankruptcy, it is too late, for
two reasons, to terminate the contract. First, once a bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed, the automatic stay of bankruptcy applies to all attempts at
either obtaining possession of the estate's property or exercising con-
trol over that property. 50 Second, while many contracts contain so-
called "bankruptcy" or "ipso facto" clauses providing for contract ter-
mination should one party file for bankruptcy, section 365(e), accord-
ing to legislative history, invalidates such clauses.' These clauses
were valid against the bankruptcy trustee, under an earlier version of
the federal bankruptcy statute, if stated not just as prohibitions against
assignment, but as express covenants that bankruptcy of a party would
terminate the contract or give the nondebtor the option to termi-
144. Id. § 365(f)(1), (3). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 
365.07, at 365-48; Countryman II, supra note 102, at 503-04 (assignability of patent licenses):
Fogel, supra note 102, at 360-64.
145. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(k) (West 1979).
146. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 545.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 545-46.
149. As noted supra Section II, completion of even one party's performance is, in the majority
view, sufficient to render the contract nonexecutory for bankruptcy purposes.
150. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West Supp. 1989); see. e.g.. R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership v.
Ramada Inns, Inc. (In re R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership). 2 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1979); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
151. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, at 365-46 (quoting House and Senate
Reports).
516
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nate.'5 2 Section 365(e) of the Code invalidates bankruptcy clauses in
both Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcies and in Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations. 15 3 It also invalidates, for the period of the bankruptcy, any
contract clause permitting termination of the contract for the debtor's
insolvency.1 54
III. SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS AS EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Lubrizol
In a 1985 Fourth Circuit case, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Rich-
mond Metal Finishers, Inc.,155 a technology license agreement was
held an executory contract rejectable by the licensor-debtor under sec-
tion 365.156 Although Lubrizol involved a technology license rather
than a software license agreement-the license gave the nondebtor-
licensee the right to use the debtor's metal-coating technology' 7-in
the wake of Lubrizol, a number of commentators warned that software
license agreements would be treated as rejectable executory contracts
in the bankruptcy of a software licensor.158
The Lubrizol licensor, acting as the debtor in possession trustee,159
convinced the bankruptcy court that the agreement giving the licensee
the nonexclusive right to use the debtor's technology was an executory
contract, 160 and that attempts at new licensing of the technology,
debtor's principal asset in the Chapter 11 reorganization, were hin-
dered by the existing license.1 61 The debtor's president, speaking as
the debtor in possession's representative,'62 testified that potential new
licensees would be more interested in purchasing rights to use the
debtor's technology if the debtor were set free of its agreement to let
152. Id. at 365-45 (quoting § 70b of the Bankruptcy Act). For cases construing § 365(e), see
Nimmer, supra note 102, at 541 n.57. For decisions applying § 70b of the Act, see Countryman
II, supra note 102, at 519-29.
153. Fogel, supra note 102, at 349. According to one commentator, an early draft of the
Code distinguished between liquidations and reorganizations, allowing bankruptcy clauses to be
effective in a liquidation. See Nimmer, supra note 102, at 544 & n.61.
154. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(e)(1)(A) (West 1977).
155. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1057 (1986).
156. Id. at 1047.
157. Id. at 1045.
158. See sources cited supra note 8.
159. See supra note 101.
160. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 Bankr. 521, 525 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)
[hereinafter case referred to as Lubrizol].
161. Id. at 526.
162. See supra note 101.
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licensee Lubrizol use the technology.1 63  Lubrizol argued that the
technology license was not executory because the debtor, before filing
bankruptcy, had executed the license agreement and delivered instruc-
tion manuals to Lubrizol.' 64 The bankruptcy court agreed with the
debtor, finding the license agreement executory. 165 The court deter-
mined that under the license agreement both the debtor and Lubrizol
had continuing contractual obligations.1 6 6 The debtor had a continu-
ing duty to notify Lubrizol about any claims of the licensed technol-
ogy infringing another's patent; defend the licensee Lubrizol in any
patent infringement suit; hold Lubrizol harmless from certain losses;
and notify Lubrizol of any licenses granted. 167  According to the
court, these obligations, even if contingent, were important aspects of
the consideration given by the licensor to Lubrizol, and therefore
could be sufficient to make the contract executory.' 68 Since Lubrizol
had an on-going duty to account for and to pay royalties to the
debtor, 169 the court found the contract executory, 7 0 and, applying the
business judgment test, '7 1 in light of the debtor's president's testimony
on the desirability of rejection, 7 2 allowed rejection.'7 3
The district court 174 reversed, finding the technology license agree-
ment nonexecutory.' 75 Even if the license was executory, the court
felt rejection would not benefit the debtor's estate, 1 6 since in the dis-
trict court's view, a bankruptcy rejection would not strip licensee
163. Lubrizol, 34 Bankr. at 526.
164. Id. at 523.
165. Id. at 525.
166. The court referenced but did not explicitly adopt Countryman's definition of executory
contract. Lubrizol, 34 Bankr. at 523; see supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
167. Lubrizol, 34 Bankr. at 522.
168. Id. at 522-23. The bankruptcy court quoted Professor Countryman, who had stated in
his article that [tlhe usual patent license ... ordinarily takes the form of an executory contract."
Id. at 525 (quoting Countryman II, supra note 102, at 501). The bankruptcy court did not
discuss Countryman's reasoning for his statement-that the patentee's implied warranty of the
validity of the patent renders the license executory. For a rebuttal to Countryman, see Morris &
Arnold, supra note 11, at 542. Under the Countryman analysis, most contracts for the sale of
goods would be executory, because article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the
seller of goods warrants title, noninfringement. and merchantability unless those implied
warranties are disclaimed. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (1987): id. § 2-314.
169. Lubrizol, 34 Bankr. at 522. 524.
170. Id. at 525.
171. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
172. Lubrizol, 34 Bankr. at 526.
173. Id. at 525-26.
174. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 Bankr. 341 (E.D. Va. 1984) [hereinafter case
referred to as Lubrizol].
175. Id. at 344.
176. Id. at 345.
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Lubrizol of its rights to use the licensed technology.177 The debtor's
president was simply a bad salesman who should have explained to-
potential licensees that Lubrizol's nonexclusive license rights would
not interfere with other exploitation of the technology. 178
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals,17 9 like the bank-
ruptcy court, found the license executory in light of the debtor's con-
tinuing duties to licensee Lubrizol and Lubrizol's duty of accounting
for and paying royalties.18 0 In the view of the court of appeals, the
district court should not have substituted its business judgment for the
debtor's in deciding whether rejection would be advantageous to the
debtor. 8' According to the Fourth Circuit, the business judgment
rule requires that a court grant a debtor in possession's request to
reject an executory contract unless the debtor's decision involves bad
faith or gross abuse of discretion.' 82 This limited judicial "business
judgment rule" scrutiny of the debtor's motives is a fact determination
for the bankruptcy court, reviewable by higher courts only under the
"clearly erroneous" standard. 183
Five years before Lubrizol, the Ninth Circuit in In re Select-A-Seat
held that an exclusive software distribution and use license was a
rejectable executory contract.18 4 In that case, the debtor's trustee did
not attempt to either revoke entirely the licensee's license, or recover
from the licensee the relevant tangible property, software packages,
and service manuals transferred by the debtor to the licensee prior to
bankruptcy.' 85 The trustee sought only to reject the debtor-licensor's
continuing warranties of title and fitness for purpose and the agree-
ment's exclusive-dealing obligation.' 86 The court allowed the former
177. Id. at 344. The district court found Countryman's statement that patent licenses are
executory contracts flawed by the fact that Countryman considered only licensee bankruptcy
cases. In a licensor bankruptcy, the court said, it is as though the licensor has already sold a
parcel of land, retaining a purchase money deed of trust to ensure payment. Countryman
correctly viewed such land sale agreements as nonexecutory, the court noted, in.spite of the fact
that after closing the seller had the obligation to defend title and the buyer had the obligation to
complete payments. Id. at 343.
178. Id.
179. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
180. Id. at 1047.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980).
Select-A-Seat was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, not the present Code. 625 F.2d at 291 n.2.
185. Id. at 292. It should be noted that the debtor and the licensee in this case were both
controlled by the same person. Id. at 291.
186. Id. at 292.
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exclusive licensee to continue using and selling the licensed software
on a nonexclusive basis.' In comparison, the court in Lubrizol held
that the licensee's right to use the licensed technology terminated
when the license agreement was rejected in the licensor's bankruptcy,
leaving the licensee with only a claim for damages for breach of con-
tract. 188  It is this aspect of Lubrizol-the possibility that a licensee
could lose all rights to the licensed technology should the licensor file
bankruptcy-that really caught the attention of software licensing
attorneys.'8 9 The Lubrizol decision has been criticized on various
grounds, 190 and the effect of the case's holding on licensee business
operations has been lamented.' 9 ' Congress has since amended section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code, statutorily allowing a licensee to retain
its use right in licensed intellectual property even if the license agree-
ment is rejected by the licensor in the licensor's bankruptcy. 192 That
amendment does not extend any special protection to licensors whose
licensees file for bankruptcy, the subject of this Article.
There are actually a few cases considering whether technology
license agreements are executory contracts in bankruptcy. To date,
there are only two reported decisions other than Select-A-Seat t93 find-
ing software license agreements executory. In Infosystems Technology,
Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., 194 the debtor-licensor wanted to reject
the software distribution agreement granted two years earlier to
187. Id. at 293. Whether current copyright law permits an exclusive copyright license to be
converted into a nonexclusive license via § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code or even to be rejected is
questionable. See infra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
The Select-A-Seat court, considering whether rejection would deprive the licensee of all rights,
analogized the software lease/license to a real property lease. Select-A-Seat, 625 F.2d at 292-93.
According to Collier on Bankruptcy, rejection of a lease can cancel covenants for heat and power.
but not the lease itself. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, - 365.09, at 365-54. What
the Select-A-Seat court overlooked is that a lessee, under real property law, has an interest in the
leasehold premises, a point recognized by the Collier treatise in explaining why the lessee gets to
remain in possession even though the lease has been rejected. See id.
188. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). The
question of the effect of § 365 rejection on the nondebtor/licensor's rights is considered in more
detail infra, notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g.. supra note 8.
190. Supra note 8.
191. See, e.g., supra note 9 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The effect of the risk of rejection
on the bargaining process is discussed in Nimmer. supra note 102.
192. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506. 102 Stat. 2538
(1988); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
193. Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980): see
supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
194. Civ. A. No. 87-0042 (D. Mass. June 25, 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6285: 1987 WL
13805).
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licensee-distributor Infosystems Technology, Inc. ("ITI").'9 5 The par-
ties did not contend that the distribution agreement was anything but
executory. 196 The bankruptcy court, applying the business judgment
rule and quoting Lubrizol's197 statement that a debtor's decision to
reject an executory contract should be accepted by the bankruptcy
court unless based on bad faith, whim, or caprice,' 98 allowed rejec-
tion. 199 The district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court
to decide whether rejection of the distribution agreement would benefit
unsecured creditors. 2" In the second software license executory con-
tract case, In re Rudaw, 2 ' the debtor had, eight months before filing a
Chapter 11 petition, entered into an agreement to sell the copyright
and all associated rights in a program to Elgar Electronics. The
debtor filed for bankruptcy before Elgar completed its installment pay-
ments for the software and sought to reject the software transfer trans-
action in the bankruptcy as an executory contract. The court
approved the rejection of the contract, finding it executory, but left
ownership of the software with Elgar.20 2
Cases involving patent license agreements and product distribution
agreements, analogous to software licenses, reinforce the fear that a
software license agreement will be found an executory contract in
bankruptcy. For example, In re Petur USA. Instrument Company20 3
held as executory a twenty-year license granted by the debtor/licensor
to the licensee to use, manufacture, assemble, and sell the debtor's
195. See In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 Bankr. 683, 684 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). ITI had
exclusive distribution rights for some lines of computers and nonexclusive rights for other lines.
Id.
196. Id. at 686.
197. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (I re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
198. Logical Software, 66 Bankr. at 686.
199. Id. at 687.
200. Infosystems Technology, Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., Civ. A. No. 87-0042 (D. Mass.
June 25, 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6285; 1987 WL 13805). In the case In re Petur U.S.A.
Instrument Co., 35 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983), the court refused to authorize
rejection of a patent license agreement, even though it viewed the debtor's desire to reject as the
result of proper exercise of the debtor's business judgement, because the entire business of the
licensee was based on the rights granted to it in that contract. Id. at 563. Cf Lubrizol, 756 F.2d
at 1048 (holding such equitable considerations inappropriate). While the Logical Software
bankruptcy court rejected the Petur court's "'balancing of equities," 66 Bankr. at 687, the district
court stated that the question of whether rejection will benefit the unsecured creditors may
involve a balancing of interests. Civ. A. No. 87-0042.
201. Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp. (III re Rudaw/
Empirical Software Prods. Ltd.), 83 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
202. Id. See infra notes 222-25 on the correctness of the Rudaw court's handling of rights in
software.
203. 35 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
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patented inventions in Canada."°4 Although the licensee argued that
the contract was not executory, the court concluded otherwise, since
the debtor had several pending obligations, including providing prod-
ucts, information, know-how, and consulting services, and the licensee
was still obligated to pay royalties on product sales.20 5 In addition,
trademark license agreements have been held to be executory con-
tracts20 6 because of the licensee's continuing duty to account for and
pay royalties and furnish sales reports, and the licensor's obligation to
notify the licensee of infringements of the licensed trademark, stop
infringements, and indemnify the licensee.20 7
B. The Nature of the Transaction
The post-Lubrizol literature has thoroughly explained that software
licenses, whether distribution agreements or end-user licenses, are
likely to contain continuing obligations for both parties. 20 8 As one
commentator has observed, from the licensor's viewpoint, one purpose
of licensing rather than selling software is imposing restrictions on the
user.209 The typical distribution agreement, for example, places a con-
tinuing accounting and royalty payment obligation on the licensee. In
a negotiated license, the licensee will wish to impose several continu-
ing obligations on the licensor-such as a commitment to defend
infringement actions and a warranty of fitness or merchantability.
Even in shrink-wrap agreements, some limited warranty obligation
might be provided by the licensor, who will impose transfer restric-
204. Id. at 562.
205. Id. at 563. Petur is also discussed supra notes 118 & 120 and accompanying text. For
another example of a bankruptcy court decision holding a patent license to be executory, see In
re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987). That court held the patent
license to be nonassignable, id. at 688, an aspect of the case considered infra Section IV.
Also, the debtor in In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc., 69 Bankr. 893 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1987), very shortly before filing for bankruptcy, granted a licensee the exclusive right to sell
the debtor's presumably patented loudspeakers. The court assumed that the contract was
executory, but refused to allow the debtor to reject it, stating that the court should not use its
equity powers to help the debtor get rid of a hastily-formed contract and avoid a suit for specific
performance. Id. at 896, 898.
206. E.g., 1I, re Chipwich, Inc., 54 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). See generally Lieb,
supra note 11, at 346-52.
207. Chipwich. 54 Bankr. at 430. The court, applying the business judgment test, allowed
rejection, noting that rejection would deprive the licensee of its rights to use the "'Chipwich'"
trademark on its products. Id. at 431. The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act.
Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988) does not affect trademark licensees. See supra note
10 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 8.
209. Feldman, supra note 8, at 15. See generally Freed, supra note 12, at 359-60 (describing
genuine licensing designed to protect trade secrets, control use of product).
Vol. 64:499, 1989
Software Distribution and Bankruptcy
tions on the licensee. If the Countryman concept of executory con-
tracts is applied,21° software license agreements are executory
contracts, especially if contingent contract obligations count, as
Lubrizol holds.21
There is, though, another reason why software distribution agree-
ments and licenses are likely to be deemed executory contracts: These
agreements appear to grant mere contract rights and not property
interests to licensees. In general, only "done deals"-outright trans-
fers of property, and completely performed or already-terminated con-
tracts-are safe from characterization in bankruptcy as executory
contracts. 212 Software license agreements do not look like "done
deals." They look like contracts whereby the software developer/
licensor grants continuing permission to a licensee to do certain
things, such as copying the software, distributing it, and using trade
secrets subject to restrictions. If this permission were short-lived, and
the obligations imposed on parties to software distribution agreements
and license agreements likely to be quickly performed, the risk of hav-
ing these agreements held to be executory would be far less: a com-
pleted contract is not subject to executory contract treatment.213
However, these agreements are set up to govern on-going relationships
with life-of-the-agreement, or longer, continuing obligations for both
parties. On-going software distribution relationships likely cannot be
handled in a contract that demands full performance by even one
party at the outset.
Consider, for example, a bare-bones exclusive distribution agree-
ment obliging the licensor only to provide one copy of the software to
the licensee for reproduction and public distribution by the licensee.
In even this agreement, the licensor is granting the licensee continuing
permission to exercise the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Also,
the exclusivity feature of the license agreement may be viewed as a
continuing obligation on the licensor's part to refrain from licensing
210. Countryman I, supra note 102, at 460.
211. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). It has
been suggested that continuing obligations be placed in a separate agreement from the license
grant. See, e.g., Dobb, supra note 8. That approach, in the view of this author, will succeed only
if the license-grant aspect of the transaction is an outright transfer. See hnfra notes 216-30 and
accompanying text.
212. Terminated contracts are discussed in more detail infra, Section V.
213. Performance by even one party, in the view of Countryman and many bankruptcy
courts, renders a contract nonexecutory for bankruptcy purposes. See supra notes 104-14 and
accompanying text.
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rights in the software to others.' 14  Furthermore, if under the agree-
ment the licensor retains title to the software copy, the licensee's pos-
session of the copy depends on the licensor's continuing permission. If
real property leases are executory contracts, and they are,21 5 then so
must the personal property lease aspect of a software license agree-
ment be executory.
It might appear, from the preceding paragraph, that as of the bank-
ruptcy of either licensor or licensee, all software distribution and
license agreements still in existence will be executory contracts. Is
there no way to make one of these agreements a "done deal," an out-
right transfer of a property interest by the licensor to the licensee?
The answer is that it is possible, under copyright law, to arrange for an
outright transfer of an interest in copyright, although, from the licen-
sor's viewpoint, that probably is not desirable.21 6  According to the
copyright statute, both assignments and exclusive licenses are transfers
of copyright ownership.2 17 More generally, outright transfers of prop-
erty completed before a seller's bankruptcy are not subject to execu-
tory contract treatment.21 8
Two recent cases, In re Stein & Day Inc.2 9 and In re Monument
Record Corp., 220 have held that assignments of copyrights constitute
prebankruptcy transfers rather than executory contracts.2 In this
214. See Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292-93 (9th Cir.
1980). The correctness of that aspect of the Select-A-Seat decision under current copyright law is
questionable. See infra notes 228-42 and accompanying text.
215. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(a), (b)(3), (b)(4), (d) (West Supp. 1989). Section 365 of the Code
provides special protection for a nondebtor lessee, allowing the lessee to remain in possession of
the leased premises even after rejection of the lease in the lessor's bankruptcy, id. § 365(h)(2), just
as intellectual property licensees are now allowed to retain their rights to the licensed intellectual
property. See supra text accompanying note 10.
216. See infra Section V.
217. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977) (definition of -transfer of copyright ownership"); see
supra note 80 and accompanying text. It is possible that failure to record the assignment or
exclusive license with the Copyright Office pursuant to 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 1977 and Supp.
1989) (amended by § 5 of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857; see supra note 28) will render the licensee's interest avoidable in
bankruptcy by the debtor's trustee under I I U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West Supp. 1989). See Feldman,
supra note 8, at 18-19; Hemnes & Montgomery, supra note 8, at 332-41. Licensees with exclusive
licenses should record their transfers of ownership to eliminate the risk of § 544(a) treatment.
Recording is not without its own complications. See Hemnes & Montgomery, supra note 8. at
371-78.
218. See generally Countryman I, supra note 102, at 458-60.
219. 81 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
220. 61 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1986).
221. Stein & Day. 81 Bankr. at 266-67; Monument, 61 Bankr. at 868-69.
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author's view, Rudaw222 should have been decided under this analysis.
In Rudaw the debtor, prior to its bankruptcy filing, conveyed all
software rights to a distributor of electronics devices, Elgar Electron-
ics. The Rudaw court indicated that the debtor's rejection of the con-
tract would not obligate Elgar to return the software because rejection
is not the equivalent of rescission.223 The completed prebankruptcy
transfer of both copyright rights and personal property rights could
not be treated as an executory contract.224 Since, according to the
copyright statute, an exclusive license is, like an assignment, a transfer
of copyright ownership, an exclusive license granted by the licensor
before bankruptcy should be a completed transfer and not an execu-
tory contract.225
222. Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp. (In re Rudaw/
Empirical Software Prods. Ltd.), 83 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); see infra notes 226-29,
250-53 and accompanying text (discussing Rudaw).
223. Rudaw, 83 Bankr. at 246.
224. The debtor in Rudaw had promised to provide a written assignment of copyright but did
not do so. Id. at 243-44. The court did not consider whether the transfer, presumably not
recorded with the Copyright Office, was voidable under § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
supra note 217 (discussion of 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)). Had the Rudaw court recognized that the
transfer had been completed before the licensor filed bankruptcy, it could have avoided its
questionable discussion of rescission. The court stated that rejection of an executory contract
under § 365 is not rescission. 83 Bankr. at 246. In this author's view, the cases cited by Rudaw
on that point are more accurately characterized as holding that rejection does not affect already
completed property transfers. See id.
225. Copyright lav should determine the characterization of the transaction, because
copyright creates the property interest, according to Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Jr. University, 817 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987). In that case the court held that
copyright assignee Stanford University transferred part of its property interest in the assigned
copyright, in violation of a contractual clause prohibiting a transfer of interest, when it granted a
third party an exclusive license to market the protected work. Id. at 503-04.
Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980), if filed
today, could also be decided by reference to copyright law's transfer principle. In Select-A-Seat
the licensor granted the licensee Fenix exclusive rights to use and license the debtor's software.
One month later, petitioning creditors put the licensor into involuntary bankruptcy. Id. at 291.
An exclusive copyright license, if properly recorded, should be construed under current
copyright law to be a completed prebankruptcy transfer rather than an executory contract. See
supra note 217 (discussing § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). While on-going license agreement
obligations-royalties, warranties-would be rejectable executory obligations, the exclusive license
itself would not be. The Select-A-Seat court's characterization of the license's exclusivity feature
as a continuing obligation on the part of the licensor to refrain from granting other licenses is
wrong as a matter of current copyright law. That obligation to refrain is given outright to the
licensee when the licensor grants an exclusive copyright license.
Questions certainly remain concerning the "completed transfer" theory laid out herein. First,
there is the problem of Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)'s applicability. See supra note 217. A second
problem concerns the scope of 17 U.S.C.A. § 203 (West 1977), under which the author of a work
other than a work for hire has the right to terminate any transfer or license at the end of thirty-
five years from the date of execution of the grant of transfer or license. Possibly this remaining
right on the part of an author/licensor is part of the property of estate of the debtor if the
licensor should file bankruptcy after granting an exclusive license. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West
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Nonexclusive copyright licenses are not transfers of copyright own-
ership.2 26 A nonexclusive license is merely a contract promising on-
going licensor permission allowing the licensee to exercise certain
copyright ownership rights.2 2 7  It is not a "done deal." The same
appears true for patent and trademark licenses-only an assignment is
an outright transfer of rights; a license, even if exclusive, is merely a
promise by the licensor to refrain from suing the licensee for infringe-
ment.22 8 However, this point may not apply to trade secrets licenses.
According to a leading treatise, the essence of the trade secrets license
is the licensor's disclosure of the licensed secrets to the licensee.2 29 If
this view is correct, the disclosure should be considered a "done deal."
Only the presence of continuing mutual obligations in the license
agreement would render a pure trade secrets license executory. 30
IV. THE RISK OF EXECUTORY CONTRACT TREATMENT:
POSSIBLE LICENSOR CONCERNS
Prior to section 365's recent amendment, 23 1 licensees and their
attorneys were concerned that licensor rejection would, under a
Lubrizol approach,2 32 strip licensees of all rights to use the licensed
technology.2 33 This part of this Article will consider licensor concerns
over licensee bankruptcy. The primary concern of most licensors in
the reverse-Lubrizol situation is not likely to be rejection, but rather
either assumption, or assumption and assignment. Beyond the licen-
1979 & Supp. 1989) (estate of the debtor). Third, what if the licensee has outright ownership of
copyright rights through an exclusive copyright license, but only possessory rights as to personal
property, such as the tangible copy of the software? Could the trustee in a licensor bankruptcy
reject the personal property lease, leaving the licensee with copyright rights but no personal
property rights? Because of the recent adoption by Congress of an amendment to § 365 allowing
intellectual property licensees to retain intellectual property rights in licensor bankruptcies, see
supra note 10, these questions may never be resolved. In this author's view, though, an exclusive
copyright licensee should, under copyright law, not even be treated as having an executory
contract.
226. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977) (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership").
227. Cf In re Huff, 81 Bankr. 531 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (distinguishing a license, which is
an executory contract rather than a property right, from a mining lease, which is an estate in
land protected under 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h)).
228. According to a leading treatise on patent law, a patent license "means only leave to do a
thing which the licensor could prevent." E. LtPSCOMB, 6 LIPscoMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS 9
(3d. ed. 1987). Cf Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984)
(copyright license is not an "interest" in copyright that vests in the bankruptcy trustee).
229. 2 R. Mtt GRIM, supra note 19, § 12.05[1][i], at 12-72.
230. See supra Section III.A.
231. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506. 102 Stat. 2538
(1988).
232. See supra Section III.A.
233. See. e.g., supra note 8.
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sor's concerns regarding the section 365 options, the licensor first will
have concerns relating to the licensee's bankruptcy.
A. Impact of Licensee Bankruptcy on Licensor: Concerns Unrelated
to Section 365
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that a licensor likely
will react negatively to a licensee's filing of bankruptcy for reasons
totally separate from section 365 concerns. The licensor may prefer
terminating the license to avoid any involvement with the other
party's bankruptcy. While contract drafters routinely provide for ter-
mination of the contract upon either party's filing of a bankruptcy
petition, under the Bankruptcy Code these clauses are of no effect; a
debtor's property interest becomes property of the debtor's estate
notwithstanding a contractual provision that "effects or gives [the
other party to the contract] an option to effect a forfeiture, modifica-
tion, or termination of the debtor's interest in property" upon the
commencement of bankruptcy.234 That Code provision effectively
nullifies such so-called "ipso facto" or bankruptcy clauses.
Also, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay, applica-
ble to all entities, of "any act to obtain possession of the property of
the estate ... or to exercise control over property of the estate." '235
While prebankruptcy contract termination is valid,23 6 once the licen-
see has filed for bankruptcy the licensor, as a party to an executory
contract, is one of the entities whose rights are affected by the licen-
234. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989). Section 365's parallel provision, stated in
§ 365(e)(1), is discussed supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
235. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984), held, inter alia, that a copyright
license is not an "interest" in copyright which vests in the trustee. Id. at 1334. The Harris court,
considering whether a bankruptcy trustee had validly conveyed the debtor's license to duplicate
and market copyrighted sound recordings to the buyer of a master tape, concluded that since a
copyright licensee has no right to assign its privilege, the licensee's trustee could not transfer the
license under § 70(a)(5) of the former Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 1332-34. Harris is discussed
further in the text, infra notes 276-82 and accompanying text (assumption/assignment). That
case should not be read to hold that a copyright license is not property of the estate of the debtor.
The current Code's approach to property of the estate is expansive. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West
1979 & Supp. 1989). Furthermore, license agreements are pulled into the bankruptcy via § 365,
which explicitly nullifies bankruptcy termination clauses. Id § 365(e)(1) (West 1977)(recodified
as § 365(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989) under § 5 of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857). See R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership v.
Ramada Inns, Inc. (In re R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership), 2 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1979).
236. See infra Section V.B.
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see's bankruptcy.237 Even if an executory contract is nonassumable,
the automatic stay prevents termination.238 Under Chapter 7, an exec-
utory contract is deemed rejected unless assumed by the trustee within
sixty days of the order for relief.2 39 In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the
"limbo" period is longer: the trustee may assume or reject an execu-
tory contract at any time before confirmation of the reorganization
plan. 24" A licensor caught up in a licensee's Chapter 11 bankruptcy
may dislike being held in limbo for several months. The Code recog-
nizes this concern, providing that the court, "on the request of any
party to [an executory contract] may order the trustee to determine
within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject [the con-
tract] .... ,,241 In the meantime, the licensor is not free to treat the
contract as terminated or nonexistent.242
B. Section 365 Concerns: Rejection
As to the section 365 treatment options, rejection, until recently the
licensee's major concern in a licensor bankruptcy, likely will be only a
minor licensor concern in a licensee bankruptcy. If, as a consequence
of rejection, the licensee must relinquish all rights granted to it in the
license agreement, the licensor, if still due royalties and performance
at the time of the bankruptcy, will lose both anticipated revenues and
the expected performance. The licensor will have a claim for breach of
the agreement,243 and will probably receive only minimal payment on
the claim.2" Rejection of the contract is likely to be a major licensor
concern only if the court allows the debtor's trustee to both retain
certain rights granted in the agreement and reject burdensome obliga-
tions, in effect rewriting the agreement. The case law on executory
contracts seems clear on this point. If the agreement is executory,245
237. Other entities whose rights are affected include unsecured and secured creditors,
judgment holders, and lien holders. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
238. See, e.g., Karsh Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Co. (ln re Karsh Travel, Inc.), 87
Bankr. 110, 112 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988).
239. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(d)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The court may, "for cause," extend the
time allowed for the trustee's decsion. Id. The "order for relief", in a voluntary bankruptcy, is
the commencement of the case, i.e., the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 301 (West 1979).
In an involuntary proceeding the "order for relief" is the court's order under § 303(h) granting
the creditors' petition.
240. Id. § 365(d)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Skeen v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (ln re Feyline Presents, Inc.), 81
Bankr. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
243. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(g) (West Supp. 1989).
244. See supra note 110 (distribution).
245. The exclusive license situation, distinguishable, in this author's view, is discussed supra
Section III.B. and infra Section V.A.
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the trustee cannot pick and choose, for example, keeping the grant to
the licensee of reproduction and distribution rights, while rejecting
obligations on the part of the licensee to pay royalties and meet distri-
bution quotas. The trustee must accept the contract cum onere or
reject it in its entirety.246
On the other hand, some courts seem confused over the effect of
rejection. Several bankruptcy courts recently have stated that
rejecting an executory contract pursuant to section 365 is not the same
as a rescission of the contract. 247 In this author's view, it is more cor-
rect to say that rejection of executory aspects of a contract does not
bring about a rescission of property transfers completed prior to bank-
ruptey.248 In a copyright context, the licensee should keep only rights
actually conveyed to him in an outright transfer before becoming a
debtor-rights granted through an assignment or exclusive license of
copyright.249 Mere contract rights such as those granted in a nonex-
clusive copyright license should not be retained by the licensee under
section 365 unless the licensee assumes the executory license agree-
ment in its entirety. If the software license agreement also grants the
licensee a right to use the licensor's trade secrets or patented technol-
ogy, under the cum onere principle those grants of rights should be
retained by the debtor only if the entire contract is assumed. Why
should the licensee retain the rights to either use or distribute software
while rejecting contractual provisions designed to protect the licensor?
While the cum onere principle seemingly prevents that result, a court
possibly could mistake the execution of even a nonexclusive license for
an outright nonexecutory grant of rights to the licensee, and thus not
rescinded by the licensee's section 365 rejection of an executory
contract.25 o
C. Section 365 Concerns: Assumption
What if the trustee in the licensee's bankruptcy wants assumption of
an executory license agreement rather than its rejection? According to
246. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, at 365-415; Nimmer, supra
note 102, at 513, 531.
247. In re Metro Transp. Co., 87 Bankr. 338, 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Rudaw/Empirical
Software Prods. Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp. (In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd.),
83 Bankr. 241, 246 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Executive Technology Data Systems, Inc., 79
Bankr. 276, 282 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1987).
248. See Rudaw, 83 Bankr. at 246; Executive Technology, 79 Bankr. at 282.
249. Cf Executive Technology, 79 Bankr. at 282 (holding that property acquired by the
debtor before bankruptcy remains property of the estate even if the trustee rejects unperformed
contract obligations).
250. Cf Rudaw, 83 Bankr. at 246 (stating that rejection is not the equivalent of rescission).
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section 365(c), the trustee may not assume or assign an executory con-
tract if "applicable law excuses [the licensor] from accepting perform-
ance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor
or debtor in possession. '51 Contract language prohibiting or restrict-
ing assignment of rights or delegation of duties is of no effect. 2
Before considering whether software license agreements are nonas-
sumable, let us first consider why a licensor might object to assump-
tion. As one commentator has observed, even if the debtor is not in
default on a contract when it files bankruptcy, the nondebtor has inter-
ests that are affected by a proposed assumption. 3
First, from the nondebtors's perspective, dealing with a party who is
in bankruptcy is different from dealing with one who is not, the cir-
cumstance in which the bargain originally arose.254 Assumption
under section 365 is a new promise to perform, not actual perform-
ance. 5 This promise to perform must be viewed in the light of the
financial situation that led the debtor into bankruptcy.25 6 Even if, in
objective terms, full performance by the debtor is still possible, the
nondebtor's perception of the likelihood of full performance may be
impaired by the other party's bankruptcy.257 From the viewpoint of
the nondebtor/licensor, assumption is a promise of future perform-
ance by an entity that differs, both in management and in relevant
business constraints, 258 from the entity originally selected to publish or
distribute software. The licensor may wonder whether the publisher
or distributor, if in a Chapter 11, can get the resources to live up to its
obligations while the plan is being developed and then after its confir-
mation. Furthermore, if the debtor/licensee is known to be a major
factor in the distribution of the licensor's product, public perception of
the licensee's financial difficulties may affect the willingness of both
intermediate distributors to deal in the product and of consumers to
buy the product. All links in the distribution chain may fear that a
Chapter 7 liquidation is inevitable, resulting in the loss of promised
support or warranty protection for intermediate distributors and end-
users.
If the debtor is in default on its obligations, the trustee cannot
assume the contract unless he or she cures or provides adequate assur-
251. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
252. Id.
253. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 531-33.
254. Id. at 532-33.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
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ance of cure, compensates or adequately assures compensation to the
other party for actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default, and
provides adequate assurance of future performance.2 5 9 No such condi-
tions apply in assuming a contract not in default, not even the require-
ment of adequate assurance of future contract performance.2 6 ° Under
general contract principles, a licensor, bankruptcy aside, would have
the right to terminate a licensee or distributor for a material breach. 26 1
Section 365 alters that law, giving the defaulting debtor the right to
cure. 62  Once the breaching licensee becomes a debtor, the trustee has
a right to cure,2 63 and thus the licensor can no longer terminate for
curable material breach. 26  A licensor may reasonably fear that the
cure, compensation, and assurance of future performance deemed
acceptable by the court will not equal what the licensor would require
from a breaching licensee to voluntarily reinstate the license
agreement.26 5
Whether, under section 365(c), 266 a licensor could block assumption
because applicable law would excuse it from accepting a substitute
performer is uncertain. The analogous modem cases involve a patent
license, In re Alitech Plastics,2 67 and a copyright license for the repro-
duction and marketing of sound recordings, Harris v. Emus Records
Corporation.z68 In Alltech, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee
wanted to assume and assign, for consideration paid by the proposed
assignee, a patent license previously granted the debtor by the patent
holder.2 69 The patentee contended that patent law and section 365(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code prohibited the proposed transfer. 27 ° The
259. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
260. See id. See generally Nimmer, supra note 102, at 533.
261. Countryman II, supra note 102, at 506.
262. Accord Nimmer, supra note 102, at 547.
263. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
264. In the case of an enforceable termination clause and a triggering termination event that
occurred prior to bankruptcy, § 365 would appear to be inapplicable since a contract would no
longer exist. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 550 & n.75. The use of termination clauses to avoid
§ 365 treatment is discussed infra, Section V.
265. Of course, the licensor, whether or not the licensee/debtor is in default, may oppose
assumption simply because the existing license agreement is no longer desirable for the licensor.
See Nimmer, supra note 102, at 531-32. Perhaps the licensee has proven difficult to deal with;
perhaps the licensor has another licensee candidate who is demanding an exclusive
distributorship. While such motivation, if on the part of the debtor, might be sufficient under the
business judgment approach to warrant court approval of rejection, the nondebtor's desire to
reject a bad deal does not enter into the § 365 analysis. See id. at 534.
266. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
267. 71 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987).
268. 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
269. Altech. 71 Bankr. at 687.
270. Id.
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bankruptcy court, after citing cases which allowed assumption of an
executory contract and cases in which the nondebtor was excused
from accepting assignment under nonbankruptcy law, 27" ' examined
patent law to determine whether the performance involved in a patent
license was, by law, nondelegable or nonassignable.2 7 2 Since patent
licenses are, according to patent law, personal and not assignable
unless made so expressly,273 the court concluded that patent license
duties are personal and nondelegable.2 74 Thus, the court concluded
that under section 365(c) the trustee lacks the power to assign the
license without licensor consent.27 5
In Harris,276 a copyright infringement suit, the question was
whether a bankruptcy trustee's earlier sale of a master recording tape
conveyed to the bankruptcy sale buyer a license to manufacture and
distribute the album.2 77 As a side issue, the court noted that transfera-
bility of a copyright license was a question of first impression in that
circuit.278  The court cited two federal district court cases from
another circuit 279 as holding that a copyright licensee cannot assign its
privilege, 280 and observed that a patent license was long considered a
nontransferable personal right.2 8 ' The Harris court held the copyright
license was nonassignable, reasoning that making a copyright license
nonassignable would accord with policies underlying the Copyright
Act, particularly licensor's interest in monitoring use of the work.
2 82
It is not surprising that there are no cases considering whether a
software license agreement is assumable, or assumable and assignable,
by a debtor/licensee under section 365 in a licensee bankruptcy.
271. Id. at 688.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 689. See generally 6 E. LIPSCOMB, LIPCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS 106-15 (3d
ed. 1987).
274. Alhtech. 71 Bankr. at 689.
275. Id.
276. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
277. Id. at 1332.
278. Id. at 1333.
279. Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), (cited in Harris. 734
F.2d at 1333); Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
(cited in Harris. 734 F.2d at 1333).
280. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333.
281. Id. (citing Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886)).
282. Harris. 734 F.2d at 1334. The Recording Industry of America, an amicus party.
contended that whether or not a copyright license is transferable by the licensee outside of
bankruptcy, such a license did pass to the bankruptcy trustee under § 70(a)(2) of the former
Bankruptcy Act, which was applicable to the case. That section, which has no parallel in the
Code, provided that "interests" in copyrights and patents vested in the trustee. The Harris court
determined that a copyright license was not an "'interest" in copyright. Id.
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Software license agreements are, after all, a fairly recent phenomenon.
However, one recent bankruptcy court decision found, in a different
context, a software license and distribution agreement assignable in
the absence of a contract provision prohibiting assignment.28 3 In Sen-
try Data, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., the licensor, a Chapter 11 debtor,
asked the bankruptcy court to order the licensee, who proposed a
licensee assignment, to rescind the license agreement and return the
licensed software.284 According to the licensor, the license agreement
was not assignable, and the licensee's proposed assignment would
materially breach the agreement.2 85 The bankruptcy court, rather
than analogizing the license agreement to a patent license and apply-
ing the patent law rule, began its analysis by stating that under appli-
cable state law a contract without provision to the contrary is
assignable unless it involves personal services.28 6 The court found that
the license agreement was not a contract for personal services.28 7 Fur-
thermore, the court felt the agreement itself "contemplate[d] convey-
ances" by the licensee, since the licensee had the right to grant
sublicenses. 288 Although the licensor apparently attempted to explain
the difference between authorizing sublicensing by the original licen-
see, necessary for a distribution agreement, and authorizing assign-
ment of the entire distribution agreement,289 the court held that the
agreement's sublicensing provision impliedly permitted contract
assignment.290
From the licensor's perspective, there is a risk that some courts,
when faced with the question of the assumability of a software distri-
bution agreement, will reject the patent law maxim that a patent
license is not transferable.2 91 Instead, a court may, in an approach
similar to the Sentry Data court's analysis, consider whether the par-
ticular agreement at issue involves such personalized duties and rights
that the law would excuse the licensor from accepting a substitute per-
former. A software license agreement is not a patent license, nor is it
even a pure copyright license.29 2 A court may view a software license
283. Sentry Data, Inc. v. Control Data Corp. (In re Sentry Data, Inc.), 87 Bankr. 943 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1988).
284. Id. at 946.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 947.
287. Id. at 949.
288. Id.
289. See supra Section I.C. (discussion of software distribution and licensing agreements).
290. Sentry Data, 87 Bankr. at 949.
291. Supra notes 272-82 and accompanying text. For additional cases, see Countryman II,
supra note 102, at 502-05.
292. See supra Sections I.A., I.B.
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or a distribution agreement as far removed from the classic nondelega-
ble contract, the personal services contract, and find that the license
involves only delegable licensee duties and assignable rights. While
the language in section 365(c) supposedly reaches more than personal
services contracts,29 3 and thus differs from the rule of law that the
Sentry Data court applied, the precise scope of 365(c) is far from clear
at this point.
Even the patent law maxim may be scrutinized in the future.
Neither A l1tech 29' nor Harris2 9 5 provides much of an explanation for
the rule that a patent license is not assignable unless expressly made
so.2 9 6 Professor Countryman offers a fuller explanation of that patent
law doctrine: patentees presumably grant licenses to licensees possess-
ing some special personal ability or qualifications to make a market for
the patented item,2 97 and so a patentee should not be forced to accept
a substitute licensee.2 95 Countryman finds the notion that all patent
licenses are personal, and thus nonassignable, "too mechanical. 29 9
He finds it conceivable that a debtor could assume a particular patent
license without harm to the patentee.3"' Similarly, it is conceivable
that a software licensee's trustee could find a qualified purchaser of the
license who, in the view of the bankruptcy court, could assume it with
no harm to the licensor. Under a case-by-case approach, even certain
patent licenses could be deemed assumable in bankruptcy. Software
distribution agreement licensors must consider the possibility of their
agreements being treated on an ad hoc basis, rather than analogized to
patent licenses, and therefore being held assumable.3 'O
293. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways. Inc.
(In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983), reh. denied. 705 F.2d 450 (5th
Cir. 1983). For examples of nondelegable personal services contracts. see Countryman II. supra
note 102, at 482-83; Fogel, supra note 102, at 352.
Trademark law, with its prohibition against assignments in gross. further complicates an ,
analysis of whether a trademark license is assumable. See Lieb. supra note 11, at 315-20. 350-52.
Nonetheless, a trademark license agreement was apparently assumed by the debtor after
extensive litigation in Men's Sportswear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans. Inc. (In re Men's Sportswear.
Inc.), 834 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir. 1987). Id. at 1136.
294. In re Alltech Plastics. Inc., 71 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W. D. Tenn. 1987).
295. Harris v. Emus Records Corp.. 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
296. See Alhech. 71 Bankr. at 689; Harris. 734 F.2d at 1334. For additional cases applying
that rule, see E. LIPSCOMB, supra note 273, at 106 n.263. 107 n.4.
297. Countryman II, supra note 102, at 503 (citing Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works. 109
U.S. 75 (1883)). Another writer refers to the "relation of trust and confidence between licensor
and licensee .... " E. LIPSCOMB. supra note 228, at 107.
298. Countryman II supra note 102, at 503.
299. Id. at 504.
300. Id.
301. Cf Sentry Data, Inc. v. Control Data Corp. (In re Sentry Data. Inc.). 87 Bankr. 943.
949-50 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1988) (rejecting licensor's contention that a software distribution
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D. Section 365 Concerns: Assignment to a Substitute Licensee
If a software distribution agreement is assumable, it may also be
assignable. So long as applicable law would not excuse the licensor
from accepting a substitute performer, the agreement will be assign-
able in spite of a "no assignments" contract clause and even in spite of
"applicable law that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment
of the contract., 30 2 The trustee must assume the contract in order to
assign it, and must provide adequate assurance of future performance
by the assignee.3 °3 Even contracts in default are assignable.30 4 While
a nonassumable contract is not assignable,30 5 any contract that is
assumable under section 365(c) is assignable under section 365(f), if
adequate assurance of future performance can be provided.30 6 Thus, a
licensor could find its software distribution license transferred to an
entity other than its chosen licensee, an event which the licensor may
find objectionable.
V. AVOIDING EXECUTORY CONTRACT TREATMENT
Summarizing the preceding section of this Article, a licensor may
wish to avoid having a license agreement to which it is a party treated
as an executory contract in the bankruptcy of a licensee. The licensor,
unlike a licensee involved in a licensor's bankruptcy, will probably fear
assumption and assignment more than rejection. The question consid-
ered next is whether a licensor can structure the license agreement
transaction to avoid or minimize the risk of executory contract treat-
ment in a licensee's bankruptcy.
A. Completion or Termination?
In general, a contract can escape executory contract treatment in a
bankruptcy of one party because one or both parties have already fully
agreement was a personal services contract). Compare Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Doplmaier, 48
Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957) (questioning the wisdom of a fixed rule for patents).
302. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(f) (West 1979). According to Alltech, § 365(f) renders any transfer
restrictions, contractual or legal, other than those covered by § 365(c), nonapplicable to the
trustee. hI re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 Bankr. 686, 688 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn 1987). In other
words, § 365(f) invalidates state laws that enforce contract anti-assignment clauses. Id. (citing
hI re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (lst Cir. 1984)).
303. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(f)(2) (West 1979).
304. See id.
305. See id. Subsection (f) has apparently been little litigated. See 2 COL.IER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, Ic 365.05, 365.07. Under the Bankruptcy Act, anti-assignment
clauses were enforceable if worded as express covenants that assignment would terminate the
contract. Id. at c 365.06 (quoting § 70b of the Bankruptcy Act).
306. See generally Nimmer, supra note 102, at 544-46.
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performed, either through a property transfer or over time; or the con-
tract was terminated by one party for the other party's material breach
before either party files for bankruptcy. Given the fact that software
license and distribution agreements are designed to cover on-going
relationships and usually involve continuing obligations for the life of
the agreement, full performance by both parties will generally occur
only over a period of time. While the licensor can, under copyright
law, complete an outright transfer of an interest in copyright by grant-
ing the licensee an assignment or exclusive license,3"7 from the licen-
sor's perspective that form of completed performance is not desirable,
because the transferred copyright rights presumably would become
assets of the debtor's estate. The licensor will likely prefer executory
contract treatment in the licensee's bankruptcy over the "completed
transfer" alternative.3 °8 In a completed prebankruptcy transfer, trans-
ferred copyright rights become part of the estate of the debtor, avail-
able to the licensee's trustee for use, sale, or lease under section 363 of
the Bankruptcy Code.30 9 If the license agreement is an executory con-
tract as of the licensee's bankruptcy, and not property owned outright
by the licensee/debtor, section 365's protections for the nondebtor will
apply to the licensor.31 Therefore, assumption will be permitted only
upon cure, compensation, and assurance regarding an existing default;
assignment, if not prohibited by nonbankruptcy law, will be permitted
only on adequate assurance of future performance by the proposed
assignee. 3 ' These section 365 protections will not apply if the licensee
has, instead of rights in an executory contract, actual ownership
rights, and it is unclear whether section 363 provides any protection
for the licensor. According to section 363, if an entity other than the
debtor has an interest in the property to be used, sold, or leased, that
entity's interest must be afforded adequate protection. 3 2 If the licen-
sor has assigned all of its rights in the software to the licensee, that
licensor may have no interest. If the licensor granted an exclusive
license to the licensee, the licensor retains an interest-the copyright
itself and all rights not transferred to the licensee. 3 If the licensor
has an interest in the property, the trustee may sell the property free of
307. See supra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
308. Cf Morris & Arnold, supra note II, at 530-40 (comparing patent assignor's position in
assignee's bankruptcy with nonexclusive patent licensor's position in licensee's bankruptcy).
309. See 11 U.S.C.A § 363 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
310. See id. § 365(b). (c), (f) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (discussed supra. Section 11).
311. See id. § 363(f)(2) (West 1979).
312. See id. § 363(e) (West Supp. 1989).
313. See generally 3 M. NIMMI R. sltpra note 27, at § 10.02 (divisibility of copyright).
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that interest only under limited conditions.3" 4 Since the copyright
rights are divisible,315 applicable nonbankruptcy law apparently per-
mits the sale of an exclusive copyright license free of the licensor's
interest.3t 6
A licensor might argue that the principle of patent license nonas-
signability applied in Alltech, 3 7 and expanded to a copyright license in
Harris,318 would prohibit the trustee from selling the licensee's exclu-
sive license or assignment of copyright. Those cases, however, dealt
with mere licenses rather than outright transfers of ownership
rights.319 An exclusive copyright license, according to Nimmer, trans-
fers title or ownership of rights to the licensee, and absent contract
restrictions, the licensee may reconvey his rights.32° Since a copyright
assignee also may reassign the rights in the protected work,32' absent
contract restrictions, the bankruptcy trustee of a licensee who has an
assignment or an exclusive copyright license probably can transfer the
assignee's or licensee's interest.322 While most license agreements con-
tain prohibitions against assignment, perhaps such clauses would be
invalid in bankruptcy under the maxim that restraints on alienation
are disfavored.323
314. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f) (West Supp. 1989).
315. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
316. The licensor should consider retaining a security interest in an assignment or exclusive
copyright license to secure the licensee's payment obligations. See Sections V.C. and V.D.
Otherwise the licensor may find the license sold by the debtor's trustee, to the benefit of the
licensor only to the extent that the licensor shares the proceeds of that sale with the other
unsecured claim holders. Cf Morris & Arnold, supra note 11, at 544-50. The licensor should
also consider making the grant of rights revocable and should include a reversion clause. See
infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
317. In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987).
318. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
319. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333-34; Alltech, 71 Bankr. at 689 (distinguishing patent license from
patent assignment).
320. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.02[B][4], at 10-25. The only analogous patent
conveyance is an assignment.
321. Id. at 10-18.
322. Cf American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 455 (6th Cir.
1942) (holding that a receiver transferred trademark rights at a receivership sale).
323. Section 363(e), which states that the trustee may use, sell, or lease property
notwithstanding a bankruptcy clause that purports to terminate the debtor's interest, does not
mention anti-assignment clauses. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(e) (West Supp. 1989). Section 365(f)
invalidation of anti-assignment clauses would not seem to apply to a nonexecutory contract. Id.
§ 365(f) (West 1979).
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:499, 1989
B. Termination of the License
Termination of the contract before bankruptcy, then, and not out-
right transfer, should be the licensor's goal.324 A court can give execu-
tory contract treatment-i.e., apply section 365's reject/assume
options-only to a contract that exists when one of the parties to the
contract files for bankruptcy.32 5 The bankruptcy court cannot revive a
contract terminated prior to the bankruptcy.326 This principle applies
not only to contracts that have expired by their own terms, but also to
contracts terminated by the nonbreaching party before the other
party's bankruptcy filing.327 While a licensor cannot unilaterally ter-
minate a license agreement once the licensee enters bankruptcy, 328
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the licensor from terminat-
ing the license earlier for default by the licensee.32 9
While there are, to date, no reported cases involving software
license agreements terminated by the licensor before the licensee's
bankruptcy, there are some analogous cases. In Grunewald v. Power
Swing Partners (In re Power Swing Partners)331 the bankruptcy court
upheld a patentee's termination of a patent license completed several
months before the licensee filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.33' Under
324. Cf Septembertide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein & Day, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 5487 (RO)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987) (1987 WL 18660); cf Henderson v. Stein & Day (In re Stein & Day.
Inc.), 80 Bankr. 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In each of those cases, authors who had conveyed
publishing rights to publisher Stein and Day sought, unsuccessfully, to get the court to grant
rescission of the publishing contracts after Stein and Day filed bankruptcy. Morris & Arnold.
supra note 11, discuss this point in a patent licensing context.
325. See In re W. & L. Assocs., Inc., 71 Bankr. 962, 966 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Lauderdale
Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. (In re Lauderdale Motorcar Corp.). 35 Bankr. 544.
548 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Midas Int'l Corp. v. M & E Enters.. Inc. (In re M & E Enters.). 23
Bankr. 820, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Jo re Benrus Watch Co.. 13 Bankr. 331. 334 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Beck, 5 Bankr. 169, 171 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980); cf Griffel v. Murphy (In
re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that if the sales agreement at issue ssas
terminated by the parties before bankruptcy, the property previously sold to the debtor would
revert to the seller, leaving the trustee no interest in the property), Schokbeton Indus.. Inc. '.
Schokbeton Prods. Corp. (In re Schokbeton Indus.. Inc.), 466 F.2d 171. 176-77 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that debtor had no rights under a franchise agreement at the time the referee in
bankruptcy sought to protect its rights).
326. W. & L. Assocs.. 71 Bankr. at 966: LauderdaleMotor Car Co.. 35 Bankr. at 548-49:A1 &
E Enters., 23 Bankr. at 822.
327. See, e.g., M & E Enters.. 23 Bankr. at 822; Benrus Watch Co.. 13 Bankr. at 331. 333-34:
Beck, 5 Bankr. at 171; In re Butchman. 4 Bankr. 379. 381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
328. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989): id. § 365(e) (West 1979): eg..
Computer Communications. Inc. v. Codex Corp. (lit re Computer Communications. Inc.). 824
F.2d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1987).
329. See generally Countryman II, supra note 102, at 506-14: Fogel. supra note 102. at 354-
55: Lieb, supra note 11, at 352-55: Nimmer, supra note 102. at 542-43.
330. 9 Bankr. 512 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
331. Id. at 518-19.
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the patent license agreement, the licensee would get sixty days' notice
of the licensor's intent to terminate the agreement for default by the
licensee. The licensee then had sixty days to cure the default.33 2 The
licensor gave the termination notice required by the agreement, and
the licensee failed to cure the default, non-payment of royalties, within
the sixty-day period allowed for cure.333 When the licensee filed for
bankruptcy, the court determined that the licensee's rights to manu-
facture and market the patented product terminated before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, sixty days after the notice of termina-
tion.33 4 Similarly, Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products
Corp. (In re Schokbeton Industries, Inc. ),335 decided under the former
Bankruptcy Act, held that the licensee/debtor's exclusive rights to
manufacture construction materials terminated when the licensee
failed to cure its default within the contract's sixty-day cure period.336
Other analogous cases involve a franchisor's termination of a fran-
chisee's right to operate under the Midas Muffler trademark, 33 7 a
department store's termination of a license allowing a beauty shop
operator to use its premises, 338 a watchmaker's termination of a licen-
see's right to sell watches under the watchmaker's trademark,33 9 and
an automobile manufacturer's nonrenewal of a dealership,34 ° all
viewed by the court as terminations completed before the franchisee or
licensee filed bankruptcy.
332. Id. at 516.
333. Id. at 518-19.
334. Id. at 519.
335. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972).
336. Id. at 177. In Schokbeton the licensee filed bankruptcy before the grace period expired.
Id. at 174. Had the Bankruptcy Code been applicable, it is possible that the automatic stay
would have prevented the running of the grace period. See In re Webster Clothes, 36 Bankr. 260,
263 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984). In any event, had the referee in Schokbeton acted promptly to protect
the licensee's rights, the outcome might have been different. According to Webster Clothes.
Schokbeton can be explained as a case in which the licensee was barred by laches from reviving
its contract rights. Id. at 264.
337. Midas Int'l Corp. v. M & E Enters. (In re M & E Enters.), 23 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982).
338. In re Beck, 5 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980). In Beck the license agreement
provided for termination on sixty days' written notice. The contract apparently did not provide
for a cure period for the licensee. The licensee filed bankruptcy before the sixty-day notice period
had run. The court held that the automatic stay did not prevent the expiration of the agreement.
which expired by its own terms sixty days after the notice date. Id. at 171.
339. In re Benrus Watch Co., Inc., 13 Bankr. 331 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
340. Lauderdale Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors Inc. (In re Lauderdale Motorcar
Corp.), 35 Bankr. 544 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983). The debtor filed bankruptcy after it received the
nonrenewal notice but before termination of the previous year's dealership agreement. The court
held that the debtor's interest expired by its own terms. Thus, there was no interest for the
bankruptcy court to assume. Id. at 548-49.
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Clauses allowing termination can be set up in several ways: Termi-
nation at will by the licensor, termination based on a specified licensee
failure (nonpayment of royalties by the licensee or failure of the licen-
see to meet objective performance criteria, for example), or termina-
tion based on the financial condition of the licensee.34 ' The licensee
may, of course, resist inclusion of a termination clause, particularly
inclusion of an at will clause.3 42  From the licensor's perspective, a
termination clause lacking a cure right or grace period for the licensee
appears more desirable than a clause providing a grace period.
3 43
Should the licensee file for bankruptcy during a contractual grace
period, the cure right passes to the trustee.
3 44
Besides providing in the license agreement for termination by the
licensor for licensee default, it would be wise to provide for reversion
of all formerly licensed or assigned rights upon termination. Auto-
matic reversion clauses are common in book publishing agreements
34 5
and are respected by the courts.3 4 6 In the case of a nonexclusive copy-
right license, a reversion clause may be superfluous, the licensee hav-
ing no real copyright property interest.3 47 In the case of an exclusive
341. See generally Nimmer, supra note 102, at 541-42. An insolvency termination clause is
invalid in bankruptcy, but is valid outside the bankruptcy context. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(e)
(West 1979).
342. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 542.
343. See In re Gordon Car Truck Rental, Inc., 59 Bankr. 956, 960 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985);
Lauderdale Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. (In re Lauderdale Motorcar Corp.). 35
Bankr. 544 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Beck, 5 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980). According
to Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984), the
automatic stay does not toll the running of time for an automatic termination clause. Id. at 1213.
344. See Countryman II, supra note 102, at 507. The licensor whose license agreement does
not contain a termination clause might, if bankruptcy of the licensee seems imminent, consider
asking the licensee to agree to termination of the contract. See Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner).
839 F.2d 533, 539 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that where a sales contract was rescinded by the
parties before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the trustee had no interest in the subject matter of
the contract); cf Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1978)
(cemetery's claim against debtor for breach of a contract to buy burial spaces had been reduced
to judgment before the debtor filed bankruptcy).
345. See, e.g.. Frankel v. Stein & Day, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd 646 F.2d
560 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf Henderson v. Stein & Day, Inc. (In re Stein & Day, Inc.), 80 Bankr. 297.
301 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) & Septembertide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein & Day Inc.. No. 86 Civ. 5487
(RO) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987) (1987 WL 18660).
346. See Frankel at 212-13.
347. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984); cf In re Beck. 5
Bankr. 169, 171 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980) (stating that a license agreement giving the licensee the
right to operate a beauty salon in the licensor's premises did not give the licensee an estate in the
licensor's property, but only a personal right for use of the premises); JI re Hall Roundtree
Assocs., No. A86-0771 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 25, 1987) (since the debtor's license to collect
rents from tenants mn an apartment complex had been revoked by the licensor/assignee of the
rents before the debtor filed bankruptcy, the collected rents were not part of the estate of the
debtor).
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copyright license, though, the grant of the license is an outright trans-
fer to the licensee of an interest in copyright. 4 The licensor's only
hope of keeping the license away from section 363's "property of the
estate" treatment 349 would lie in a termination and reversion clause.
The same is true of an assignment. While an automatic reversion
clause may be sufficient to revest in the licensor the copyright rights
previously transferred to the licensee,350 the licensor who terminates a
license agreement should also obtain a written acknowledgment of the
reversion from the licensee, thus eliminating any doubt as to the licen-
see's remaining rights."'
C. Security Interest Fall-Back for PreBankruptcy Termination
If a bankruptcy court truly cannot give the debtor property interests
the debtor does not have as of the bankruptcy filing date, 352 pre-
bankruptcy contract terminations will likely hold up in bankruptcy
courts.353 Nonetheless, it is possible that a bankruptcy court could
view the licensor's termination of the license agreement, even if done
before the licensee files bankruptcy, as voidable as a disfavored forfei-
ture, thus deeming the contract as still in effect.354 Because of this
risk, in addition to a termination clause and contractual reversion of
348. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
349. See supra Section V.A.
350. See Frankel v. Stein & Day, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 209, 212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
351. Cf. In re Executive Technology Data Systems, 79 Bankr. 276, 279 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987) (while sellers had a contract right to reacquire assets on default by the buyer, they had not
done so when the buyer filed bankruptcy). A transfer of copyright ownership must be written to
be valid. 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West 1977). If the exclusive copyright license has been recorded,
the reversion appears to be a second transfer that should also be recorded. See supra notes 74-77
and accompanying text. If the reversion of an exclusive copyright license is not recorded, it
might be voidable in the licensee's bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West Supp. 1989).
See Hemnes & Montgomery, supra note 8, at 332-41.
352. See Midas Int'l Corp. v. M & E Enters., Inc. (In re M & E Enters., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 820,
822 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1982); Schokbeton Indust., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp. (In re
Schokbeton Indust., Inc.), 466 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1972).
353. See cases cited in notes to Section V.B.
354. See, eg., Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974).
See generally Countryman II, supra note 102, at 519-29; Lieb, supra note 11, at 355.
It should also be noted that there is a risk that a bankruptcy court will hold a termination
followed by a reinstatement at a higher price to be a voidable fraudulent conveyance. See Darby
v. Atkinson (In re Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (discussed in Fogel, supra note
102, at 347). Also, in Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1988), the trustee
argued that the termination and rescission of an installment sales contract by agreement of the
parties shortly before the buyer filed bankruptcy was a voidable preference under II U.S.C.A.
§ 547 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court's conclusion stemmed from its erroneous
finding that the contract was nonexecutory. Griffel, 839 F.2d at 537-38. The Ninth Circuit
found the contract to be an executory contract cancelled before the filing of bankruptcy.
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rights, the licensor should consider retaining a security interest in the
license, in any outright grant of copyright rights, and in any tangible
personal property in which the licensee receives rights. The trigger
clause for foreclosure on the security interest may focus on the same
licensee default events as the termination clause, such as nonpayment
of royalties. Still, a bankruptcy court possibly would view a secured
party's exercise of its Article 9 foreclosure rights, rights exercised
before the licensee's bankruptcy filing, more favorably than a licen-
sor's prebankruptcy termination of the license agreement pursuant to
a contract termination clause. Security interests are normally present
in a bankruptcy, and bankruptcy law respects the rights of secured
creditors.3 5 5 A foreclosure completed before the licensee enters bank-
ruptcy will not be reversed in bankruptcy.35 6 The retained security
interest should secure all obligations of the licensee under the license
agreement. 357  State law governs sale and foreclosure, even if the
security consists of copyright rights.3" 8 Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides for foreclosure by disposing of the collateral,
the proceeds going to the secured party. 9 The licensor could bid on
the collateral at a public foreclosure sale, deducting what it is owed by
the licensee from its bid.36 ' The licensor might also be able to retain
the collateral in full satisfaction of the licensee's debt.36 1
355. See II U.S.C.A. § 725 (West Supp. 1989) (referring to a lien as an example of an interest
in property); id. § 363(e), (f); id. § 362(d).
356. If the foreclosing creditor has not yet disposed of the collateral as of the bankruptcy
filing, it may be required to return the collateral for the estate of the debtor. See United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983). See generally L. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR
CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 124-29 (1985).
357. See generally, Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral-Patents. Trade Secrets.
Trademarks and Copyrights. 36 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1981) (security interests in intellectual
property); Concoff, Motion Picture Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Problems in Peifection. 13 UCLA L. REv. 1214 (1966); Feldman, supra note 8; Hemnes &
Montgomery, supra note 8; Morris & Arnold, supra note 11; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note
73; Note, supra note 73.
358. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 10.05[A], at 10-45. The licensor should record its
security interest with both the Copyright Office and as required by state law. See 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 101 (West 1977) (definition of"transfer of copyright ownership"); id. § 205 (amended by § 5 of
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No, 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (West
Supp. 1989)). See generally the sources cited note 357.
359. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1987). See generally Hemnes & Montgomery. supra note 8, at 360-
65.
360. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987).
361. See id. § 9-505.
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D. Failure To Terminate: What Then?
1. Contract Termination Rights: Applicability
When Licensee Is in Bankruptcy
Even with the best termination clause and security agreement, the
licensor may be surprised by a licensee's bankruptcy filing before the
licensor can complete the contract termination process. According to
one recent case, if a contract party mails a notice of termination to the
other party, and the other party files for bankruptcy before it receives
the notice, the contract termination is barred by the automatic stay.362
Other cases hold that the filing of bankruptcy during the pretermina-
tion notice period or cure period blocks the nondebtor's exercise of its
contractual termination rights.3 63 The licensor may have avoided
exercising its contractual termination rights because the licensee
assured cure of performance defaults; 364 it may have sensed something
wrong with the financial condition of the licensee without spotting
anything that constitutes a "trigger" event under the license's termina-
tion clause; or it may have simply failed to complete termination
formalities.3 65
There is some possibility that if the licensee is seriously in default
when it files bankruptcy, the licensor can get the court to grant termi-
nation or rescission of the contract. In theory, a material breach by
the licensee before the licensee files bankruptcy will, under general
contract principles, 366 render the agreement terminable at the option
of the licensor. According to Professor Countryman, a material
362. R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership v. Ramada Inns, Inc. (In re R.S. Pinellas Motel
Partnership), 2 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979). In that case the licensor Ramada Inn
mailed a notice of its termination of Pinellas Motel's license to operate as a Ramada hotel on the
same day that Pinellas filed a Chapter 11. The court held that the notice did not take effect until
received and that the notice of termination received by the debtor after filing a Chapter 11
petition had no force or effect.
363. See In re Webster Clothes, Inc., 36 Bankr. 260, 263-64 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984); Executive
Square Office Bldg. v. O'Connor, 19 Bankr. 143, 146 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1981). But see
Schokbeton Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prodts. Corp. (In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc.), 466 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1972). In Schokbeton the licensee filed bankruptcy before the cure period had run,
but it did not raise the question of termination of the license until the licensor was ready to award
the license to another entity, several months after the cure period had ended.
364. Cf Grunewald v. Power Swing Partners (In re Power Spring Partners), 9 Bankr. 512,
519 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (licensee argued unsuccessfully that the patent licensor's
negotiations with the licensee during the post-notice cure period was a waiver of the election to
terminate).
365. See In re Executive Technology Data Systems, 79 Bankr. 276, 279 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987).
366. See In re Beck, 5 Bankr. 169, 171 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980) (quoting Thompson v. Texas
Mexican R., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946), which stated that a right to terminate survives the
adoption of an executory contract by the trustee).
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breach by a party to an executory contract before its bankruptcy gives
the nonbreaching party "a unilateral option either to treat his own
obligations under the contract as discharged and claim damages for
the breach or to waive the breach and treat the contract as still in
effect."' 36 He noted, though, that this option is qualified to the extent
that nonbankruptcy law allows a cure right to the defaulting party;368
if a cure right exists for the debtor, the trustee in bankrutcy takes that
right.369 Countryman concluded that if the trustee wants to assume
an executory contract, he should be able to cure a default and assume
the contract unless the debtor's contractual or state-law cure period
has run.370 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, though, which
became effective several years after Countryman wrote, may provide a
federal bankruptcy cure right.31  Even if state law and the contract
itself do not give the debtor a cure right, the trustee apparently cannot
be denied the right to cure defaults and assume the contract.372 Fur-
thermore, even if Countryman's principle still rings true, the cure
right in section 365(b) applying only to nonmaterial breaches, whether
the pre-bankruptcy breach by the licensee is major or minor will be
determined by the court.3 73 Materiality will be decided based only on
367. Countryman II, supra note 102, at 506.
368. Id. at 507.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Fogel, supra note 102, at 355-56; Nimmer, supra note 102, at 547.
372. Nimmer, supra note 102, at 547 (referring to 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(1)). See, e.g., In re
W. & L. Assocs., Inc., 71 Bankr. 962, 966 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (most debtors have breached at
least some aspects of their executory contracts prepetition; § 365(b) provides debtors then with
an opportunity to cure and retain the contract); In re Webster Clothes, Inc., 36 Bankr. 261, 264
(Bankr. D. Md. 1984) (court is "loathe to enforce a forfeiture [of an option to renew a lease] on
the basis of a minor default"); Executive Square Office Bldg. v. O'Connor, 19 Bankr. 143, 146
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1981) (under § 365(b), the trustee may assume a lease that had not been fully
terminated under state law before the lessee's bankruptcy, irrespective of the expiration of the
lease grace period). But see Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (1984) (filing of
bankruptcy did not expand the debtor's rights to provide a right to cure where neither the
contract nor applicable state law provided a cure right); In re Murtishi, 55 Bankr. 564, 567
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (where debtor has breached the contract prepetition so that the
nondebtor has no further duty to perform, the contract is not executory for § 365 purposes);
Lauderdale Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors Inc. (In re Lauderdale Motorcar Corp.), 35
Bankr. 544, 548 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (indicating, in dicta, that a debtor who had
opportunity to cure before filing bankruptcy cannot save a contract by relying on a federal
bankruptcy right to cure).
373. Cf Septembertide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein & Day, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 5487 (RO)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987) (1987 WL 18660). In that case a company holding rights to a novel
maintained that it had terminated its publishing contract with the publisher Stein and Day over a
year before Stein and Day filed bankruptcy, because Stein and Day failed to make a scheduled
payment of $125,000. When the nonbreaching party sought a declaration that all of Stein and
Day's rights under that publishing contract had been terminated and all rights in the novel had
reverted to the plaintiff, the court noted that since the contract did not contain a "'reversion on
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the licensee's prebankruptcy defaults.37 While a contract clause pro-
viding for automatic termination of the contract in the event of a
stated licensee default might increase the licensor's chances of showing
that the breach was material, 3 " the court may still give a section 365
cure right to the trustee, Congress arguably so intending.376 Thus, the
bankruptcy courts are unlikely to grant licensor requests for the termi-
nation of agreements not terminated by the licensor before the licen-
see's filing for bankruptcy. 377
2. The Benefit to the Licensor of Having a Security Interest
Failing termination of the license before the licensee's bankruptcy
filing, the licensor will benefit from having a security interest in the
license, in any transferred intellectual property rights, and in any per-
sonal property interests conveyed to the licensee. The licensor's pri-
mary concern in this situation is likely to be either a section 363 sale of
the licensee's copyright interests, if the licensee has an assignment or
nonpayment" clause, the court would have to decide whether the nonpayment of the final
advance was a breach "so material and willful, or, if not willful, so sustained and fundamental as
to strongly defeat the object of the parties in making the contract." Only in such circumstances
would the plaintiff be entitled to rescission or termination. The court concluded that the
publisher's failure to pay the plaintiff $125,000, one-third of the total advance, was not grounds
for rescission or termination.
The contract in Septembertide contained a bankruptcy clause, but the plaintiff placed no
reliance on that clause in its attempt to get rescission. Id. at n.2.
374. See Henderson v. Stein and Day, Inc. (In re Stein & Day, Inc.), 80 Bankr. 297, 301 n.1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980).
375. See id., 80 Bankr. 297, 301 n.1 (distinguishing a case in which the contract had expressly
provided for reversion of publication rights to the author on the publisher's failure to pay
royalties); Septembertide, No. 86 Civ. 5487 (distinguishing Frankel v. Stein & Day, 470 F. Supp.
209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the contract's termination provision was held to be strong evidence
that nonpayment of royalties was viewed by the parties at contract-drafting time as material
breach).
376. See Fogel, supra note 102, at 355-56.
377. The licensor should consider, as a procedural vehicle for getting a decision on the status
of the license, either a motion to compel assumption or rejection by the debtor under § 365(d)(2),
or a motion for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d). See, e.g., Skeen v. Denver Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. (In re Feyline Presents, Inc.), 81 Bankr. 623, 627 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988)
(nondebtor should have used § 365(d)(2)); cf R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership v. Ramada Inns,
Inc. (In re R.S. Pinellas Motel Partnership), 2 Bankr. 113, 119 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979) (court
has equity powers to protect debtor's property rights).
A contract for a stated period of time, according to one bankruptcy court, can expire even
though one party to the contract is in bankruptcy and the automatic stay in effect. Lauderdale
Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors Inc. (In re Lauderdale Motorcar Corp.), 35 Bankr. 544,
548 n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). Some software license agreements will fall in this category.
Others, however, involve long-term or even "perpetual" grants of rights. For future contracts,
the licensor seriously concerned about possible licensee bankruptcy might consider, in addition
to, or as an alternative to a "termination for cause" clause, limiting the term of the agreement in
order to minimize the possible assumable-in-bankruptcy contract term.
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exclusive copyright license;378 or a section 365 assumption and assign-
ment of a license agreement held to be an executory contract. 379 Let
us first consider whether the licensor's retention of a security interest
might possibly hinder either of those feared treatments of the license
agreement.
Secured creditors receive protections in bankruptcy that are
unavailable to unsecured creditors.38 The trustee must, on request of
"an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased or pro-
posed to be used, sold, or leased, ' 381' either prohibit the use, sale, or
lease as necessary to adequately protect the other party's interest, or
condition the proposed treatment to provide adequate protection.382
While it is unclear exactly how this provision applies to the proposed
sale of the licensee's exclusive license of copyright rights, the licensor
might argue that the asset's proposed bankruptcy sale to one of the
licensor's competitors could not possibly be conditioned so as to ade-
quately protect the licensor's security interest. If the trustee proposes
a transfer of the licensee's rights to a party with doubtful performance
ability, the licensor may get the court to impose conditions to ade-
quately protect the licensor's interest.383 If the license is sold subject
to the licensor's security interest, the licensor can foreclose 384 in the
event of default by the assignee. It seems unlikely that the license
could be sold free of the licensor's security interest. 385 The licensor
can bid at a bankruptcy sale and deduct its claim against the license
from the bid price.386 Presumably these protections also apply to a
licensor security interest in an executory, nonexclusive, license that is
to be assumed and assigned under section 365. While section 365(f)
imposes additional protections for the nondebtor whose executory
contract is assigned,38 7 the Bankruptcy Code's protection for a secured
party's interests should apply as well.
If the licensee files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, unsecured creditors
can have a plan of reorganization "crammed down" despite their dis-
approval, if one "impaired" class accepts the plan and all rejecting
378. See supra Section V.A.
379. See supra Section IV.
380. See generally Hemnes & Montgomery, supra note 8, at 367; Morris & Arnold, supra note
11, at 534-37.
381. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e), (f) (West Supp. 1989).
382. Id.
383. See id. § 361 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
384. See supra Section V.C.
385. See U.S.C.A. § 365(f) (West 1979).
386. See id. § 365(k). See generally Morris & Arnold, supra note 11, at 535-36.
387. See supra Sections II, V.A.
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classes are treated fairly and equitably.388 Unsecured creditors are
treated fairly and equitably so long as no class junior to them receives
anything under the plan.389 Secured creditors, though, are considered
fairly and equitably treated in the reorganization plan only if they
retain their liens and are given either one, a right to deferred cash
payments totalling the amount of their interests in the collateral; two,
a lien on the proceeds of the sale of that property; or three, "the indu-
bitable equivalent" of their claims.390
Next, let us consider whether a security interest will improve the
position of a licensor whose license agreement is rejected in the licen-
see's bankruptcy. If the license is rejected, the unsecured licensor will
have only an ordinary unsecured claim 39 1 for both past-due royalties
and the breached future obligations which will now clearly remain
unfulfilled by the licensee.392 In general, a security interest improves a
creditor's chances of being paid in full in the bankruptcy. While
unsecured creditors will, in a Chapter 7, share only what is left of the
unencumbered property of the debtor after administrative expenses 393
are paid,394 a secured creditor retains a property interest in the collat-
eral.395 The trustee is permitted to charge that collateral with the rea-
sonable and necessary expenses of its preservation and disposal,396 but
otherwise the secured party's lien interest will be respected in the
bankruptcy. Normally the trustee will either pay off the secured party
out of the proceeds of the collateral's sale,397 or give the collateral to
the secured party.398
If rejection of a software license agreement completely terminates
the licensee's rights, 399 the collateral-the licensed rights-will revert
to the licensor anyway, making the licensor's security interest super-
fluous.' This analysis suggests that when an executory license is
rejected, the licensor will be better protected through a letter of credit
388. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
389. Id. § l129(b)(2)(B).
390. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
391. See id. § 502; id. § 506.
392. See id. § 502; id. § 506.
393. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
394. See id. § 507; id. § 726.
395. See id. § 506.
396. See id.
397. See id. § 725 (West Supp. 1989).
398. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 725 (West Supp. 1989).
399. See supra Section IV.B.
400. See supra Section IV.B.
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than through a security interest.4 1 If the agreement is assumed,
though, a security interest adds to a licensor's protection. 4 2  That
would also be true if the court mistakenly allows the licensee to retain
licensed rights in spite of rejection of a nonexclusive license.4 3 Since
at contract-drafting time the licensor cannot predict whether the
license agreement might be assumed or rejected in a future licensee
bankruptcy, and how the court might view rejection, the retention of a
security interest becomes very desirable.40 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Software distribution agreements and licenses will likely be treated
as executory contracts in licensee bankruptcies, just as they are in
licensor bankrupties. Licensors-like licensees before the recent
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code protecting licensee rights in licen-
sor bankruptcies-may wish to avoid executory contract treatment in
licensee bankruptcies. Looking at the Section 365 executory contract
treatment options-rejection, assumption, and assignment-from the
perspective of a licensor, assumption and assignment will be highly
undesirable. Rejection will be of major concern to the licensor only if
the trustee, contrary to present law, can retain certain licensed rights
while rejecting other aspects of the licensee agreement.
Once a licensee has filed for bankruptcy, any attempt by the licensor
to unilaterally terminate the agreement will be invalid. It is unlikely
that a bankruptcy court will grant rescission to a licensor if the licen-
see's trustee wants to cure defaults and assume the contract. The
licensor's best protection of its interests against the risk of licensee
bankruptcy lies in the licensor's exercise of contract termination clause
rights before the licensee files for bankruptcy. Rentention of a security
interest by the licensor will be valuable to the licensor whether or not
the licensor manages to exercise its contractual termination rights
before the licensee files for bankruptcy. Though the computer
401. See generally Baird, Stand-by Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 130
(1982).
402. See supra notes 379-90.
403. See supra Section IV.B.
404. In any license agreement that transfers copyright rights to the licensee, those rights will
be property of the estate of the debtor; § 365 rejection should not be applicable, as there has been
a completed prebankruptcy transfer. See supra Section V.A. The licensor's security interest in
licensed rights, if the trustee sells those rights, will give the licensor § 363 protections. See supra
Section V.A. In the alternative, in a Chapter 7 the trustee may abandon the collateral to the
secured party, the licensor. In a Chapter 11, the licensor with a security interest in property to
be kept by the licensee will have protection not available to an unsecured creditor. See supra
notes 388-90 and accompanying text.
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software industry continues to expand in size and influence, negative
growth-such as licensee bankruptcy-is inevitable. Contract drafters
would be foolish not to prepare against such eventualities.
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